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SUMMARY 
 
Uncertainty pervades most of the events and decisions that we face every 
day. Uncertainty exists in previously acquired knowledge (prior) and on what 
our senses currently tell us (likelihood). Moreover, uncertainty exists in both 
non-social and social settings (social uncertainty). Understanding how the 
brain responds to and uses information about uncertainty thus seems crucial 
if we want to understand decision-making. 
This thesis sought to understand uncertainty at different levels. We 
started by asking which areas of the brain are involved in representing and 
dealing with prior and likelihood uncertainty. We developed a decision-
making task in which both prior and likelihood uncertainty were varied and 
had subjects perform the task while we scanned their brains using functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). We found that the brain represented 
both types of uncertainty, but they had very distinct representations: 
likelihood uncertainty activated brain areas along the early stages of the 
visuomotor pathway, while prior uncertainty was associated with increased 
activations in specialized brain areas outside this pathway, namely 
putamen, amygdala, insula and orbitofrontal cortex. Furthermore, activity 
from the putamen also correlated with subjects’ tendencies to sense and 
attend to current versus prior information. Our results thus suggest different 
pathways through which prior and likelihood uncertainty are represented in 
the human brain, offering insights into the neural pathways that allow 
humans to make decisions. 
Based on the obtained results, we next aimed to understand the 
specific role putamen activity had in decision-making under uncertainty. 
Furthermore, because dopamine is one of the main neurotransmitters of the 
putamen and has previously been implicated in decision-making under 
uncertainty, we also sought to understand the influence dopamine plays in 
the decision-making process. For that purpose we recruited patients with 
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Parkinson’s disease (PD), in whom the putamen activity is compromised 
due to a lack of dopamine, to perform the same task, and compared them 
with age-matched controls. We hypothesized that if dopaminergic activity 
from the putamen is causally involved in some aspect of decision-making 
under uncertainty, this will then show in the way PD patients perform the 
task. Moreover, we hypothesized that these differences would be 
particularly salient if PD patients performed the task after they were off 
dopaminergic replacement medication overnight (off-state), compared with if 
they just took their medication 1 hour before (on-state). We found that some 
aspects of decision-making under uncertainty were conserved in PD 
patients: both groups could learn prior distributions and use prior and 
likelihood information. However, PD patients, particularly in the off-state, 
were impaired at reacting to differences in likelihood uncertainty. Together, 
our results indicate that dopaminergic activity from the putamen has a 
crucial role in the processing of uncertainty in the current sensory stimulus 
(likelihood uncertainty), potentially through increased attention towards it. 
Finally, we asked how people deal with uncertainty stemming from 
social interactions. Specifically, we aimed at understanding if trust, which 
can be defined as a positive expectation in the face of social uncertainty, 
would vary depending on whether the situation was framed in a monetary or 
movement effort way. We developed a trust game based on movement 
effort and compared the results with those of a computational equivalent 
monetary trust game. We found no difference in trust between both 
conditions. Moreover, there was a high positive correlation in subjects’ 
behavior across conditions. These results suggest that the way people deal 
with social uncertainty may be a character trait: subjects that trust more in 
monetary settings behave similarly during exchanges of movement effort. 
In summary, the work presented in this thesis advances the 
understanding of how people deal with different kinds of uncertainty, 
suggesting precise roles for specific brain areas and for dopamine in 
decision-making under uncertainty. 
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RESUMO 
 
A incerteza pervade a maioria dos acontecimentos e decisões que temos 
de tomar no dia-a-dia. Existe incerteza no conhecimento previamente obtido 
(distribuição a priori) e no que os nossos sentidos nos dizem correntemente 
(verossimilhança). Além disso, existe incerteza não só em contextos não-
sociais mas também em contextos sociais (incerteza social). Uma melhor 
compreensão de como o cérebro humano responde e usa informação sobre 
incerteza parece portanto crucial se quisermos entender melhor como são 
tomadas decisões. 
Esta tese teve como objectivo tentar perceber a incerteza a vários 
níveis. Começámos por tentar perceber que áreas do cérebro estão 
envolvidas na representação e uso da incerteza relacionada com a 
informação a priori e com a verosimilhança. Para isso, desenvolvemos um 
teste em que variámos tanto a incerteza relacionada com a distribuição a 
priori como a relacionada com a informação corrente (verossimilança), e 
pedimos a voluntários para fazer o teste enquanto os submetiamos a um 
exame de ressonância magnética funcional (fMRI). Os nossos resultados 
indicaram que o cérebro representa ambos os tipos de incerteza, mas que 
estas têm representações muito distintas: a incerteza na informação 
corrente activou regiões cerebrais ao longo da via visuo-motora, enquanto 
que a incerteza relacionada com a distribuição a priori estava associada 
com maior activação em regiões cerebrais especializadas fora desta via, 
nomeadamente o putamen, a amígdala, a ínsula e o cortex prefrontal. Além 
disso, a actividade do putamen estava também correlacionada com 
tendências individuais para notar e reagir a informação corrente versus a 
priori. Os nossos resultados sugerem vias diferentes pelas quais a incerteza 
associada à informação a priori e à informação corrente são representadas 
no cérebro humano, apresentando os possíveis mecanismos neuronais que 
possibilitam ao ser humano tomar decisões com incerteza associada. 
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 Face aos resultados obtidos, procurámos de seguida perceber qual 
a função específica que a actividade neuronal do putamen tem na tomada 
de decisões com incerteza associada. Mais ainda, quisemos também saber 
se a dopamina estaria envolvida no processo, uma vez que é um dos 
neurotransmissores mais importantes do putamen e foi já implicada 
previamente em tomadas de decisão com incerteza. Pedimos a pacientes 
com a doença de Parkinson, nos quais a actividade neuronal do putamen 
está afectada devido à falta de dopamina, para fazer o mesmo teste, e 
comparámos o seu comportamento com um grupo controle da mesma 
idade. A nossa hipótese era que, se a actividade dopaminérgica do 
putamen estivesse causalmente envolvida nalgum dos aspectos de tomada 
de decisão com incerteza associada, então isso iria ser visível na forma 
como os doentes de Parkinson fazem o teste. Além disso, pusémos a 
hipótese de que essas diferenças seriam particularmente salientes se os 
doentes de Parkinson tivessem feito o teste depois de terem estado sem 
tomar medicação dopaminérgica durante várias horas (off-state) em 
comparação com a situação em que tivessem tomado a medicação 1 hora 
antes (on-state). Verificámos que vários aspectos da tomada de decisão 
com incerteza associada estavam intactos em doentes de Parkinson: 
ambos os grupos (pacientes e controlos) conseguiram aprender a 
distribuição a priori e usar informação tanto da distribuição a priori como da 
verossimilhança. Contudo, os doentes de Parkinson, especialmente se 
estivessem em off-state, tinham problemas em reagir a diferenças na 
incerteza associada à verossimilhança. De um modo geral, os nossos 
resultados indicam que a actividade dopaminérgica do putamen tem uma 
função crucial no processamento da incerteza associada ao estímulo 
sensorial corrente (incerteza na verossimilhança), potencialmente através 
do aumento da atenção dirigida a este. 
Por último, perguntámos como é que as pessoas lidam com a 
incerteza proveniente de interacções sociais. Mais especificamente, 
queríamos perceber se a confiança noutras pessoas, que pode ser definida 
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como uma expectativa positiva face à incerteza associada à interacção 
social, iria variar dependendo se a troca social fosse apresentada como 
uma troca monetária ou de esforço físico. Desenvolvemos para isso um 
jogo de confiança baseado em esforço físico e comparámos os resultados 
com um jogo de confiança monetário computacionalmente equivalente. Não 
foram encontradas diferenças em termos de confiança entre as diferentes 
condições. Além disso, verificámos que o comportamento dos voluntários 
numa condição estava fortemente e positivamente correlacionado com o 
seu comportamento na outra condição. Estes resultados sugerem que a 
forma como as pessoas lidam com incerteza social pode ser uma 
característica da sua personalidade: pessoas que confiam mais noutras 
pessoas numa situação monetária também confiam mais numa situação em 
que é requerido esforço físico. 
Em resumo, o trabalho apresentado nesta tese avança o 
conhecimento de como é que as pessoas lidam com diferentes tipos de 
incerteza, sugerindo funções específicas para certas regiões cerebrais e 
para a dopamina no processo de tomada de decisões com incerteza 
associada. 
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“The truth would be literally nothing but the shadows of the images.” 
      Plato 
1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Uncertainty is everywhere 
Uncertainty is everywhere. The information that we get from the world at any 
point of time is uncertain, because there is inherent noise in our senses. 
Additionally, any information that we have must be somewhat uncertain, 
since we only observe incomplete portions of the world, or shadows of the 
reality, as beautifully illustrated by Plato’s allegory of the cave (Plato, 360 
B.C.). Nevertheless, every day we have to make decisions that have some 
associated uncertainty, ranging from small unconscious decisions (e.g. 
where to step next) to potentially life-changing situations (e.g. what career 
should I choose? should I marry this person?). Therefore it may be argued 
that a central purpose of the nervous system is to estimate the state of the 
world and make decisions based on uncertain information (Helmholtz, 1856, 
Smith, 2001). 
 
1.2 How to deal with uncertainty? Bayes theory 
How does, then, the brain deal with uncertainty? A related question that we 
can ask is how should the brain deal with it? This second question differs 
from the first one in the sense that it not only aims at describing how a 
certain problem is solved, but it tries to find what would be the optimal 
solution for it. This sort of reasoning drives a line of research called 
normative models, which start with an idea of what the objective of a given 
system could be and then derive what would be the optimal solution to 
arrive at that objective. The model predictions are then usually compared 
with the way the system actually behaves or is organized (Kording, 2007). In 
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this way, normative models can test hypotheses about the potential purpose 
of parts of the nervous system. 
The best way to deal with uncertain information is given by Bayes 
theory (Glimcher, 2003). Bayesian statistics gives a systematic way of 
calculating optimal estimates based on noisy or uncertain data. Bayesian 
statistics models of the nervous system start with the idea that the nervous 
system needs to estimate variables in the world that are relevant (Xtrue) 
based on sensed information (Xsensed), typically coming from our sensory 
systems (e.g. audition, vision, olfaction). Bayes rule (Bayes, 1764) then 
allows calculating how probable it is that a certain hypothesized x is the true 
x (xtrue) given the sensed information xsensed: 
 
                 
                        
          
  (1) 
 
For example, consider that you are a goalkeeper in a soccer match and you 
have a player from the other team shooting the ball towards your goal (see 
the cover of this thesis). In order to try to prevent the other team from 
scoring a goal, you have to estimate the position of the ball (xtrue = “position 
of the ball”) given what your senses are telling you now (xsensed = “sensed 
position”). In our example, let’s say that you are trying to guess the 
probability that the ball is being kicked to the right side of the goal given 
what you are seeing at the moment (i.e. you are trying to estimate p(xtrue | 
xsensed)). You can then combine the probability of observing the ball at that 
particular location if the ball was being kicked to the right (p(xsensed / xtrue)) 
with the previous knowledge that you have about where this specific player 
generally kicks the ball (p(xtrue)). Mathematically, the equation above can be 
seen as a way of updating the previous belief about the world, or prior 
(p(xtrue)) by the current sensory information, or likelihood (p(xsensed / xtrue)), 
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divided by a normalizing constant (p(xsensed)), in order to arrive to a 
posterior probability (p(xtrue | xsensed)). You can then calculate a posterior 
probability for each of your hypotheses (e.g. the ball is going to the right or 
to the left), choose the one with the highest probability, and behave 
accordingly (e.g. throw yourself to the right or the left to try to defend the 
goal)1.  
If we assume that both the prior and current sensory information 
follow a normal distribution, then Equation 1 can be written as (Kording and 
Wolpert, 2004): 
 
                 
 
       √  
 
 
               
 
        
  
      √  
 
 
              
 
       
 
          
 
 
In order to get the optimal estimate we can find the maximum by 
differentiating and equaling to zero (Kording and Wolpert, 2004). The 
resulting optimal estimate is basically a weighted sum of the mean of the 
prior and the current sensory information (in our example it would be the 
perceived position of the ball): 
 
     
       
 
       
        
        
      
 
       
        
          (2) 
 
                                                          
1 This if you are using a maximum-a-posteriori (MAP) approach. 
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where xest is the optimal estimate (e.g. the optimal estimate of the position of 
the ball),  2sensed and  
2
prior are the variances of the likelihood and of the 
prior, respectively, and sensed and prior are the respective means.  
 
Figure 1.1 –Schematic illustration of the combination of the prior distribution 
with the distribution of the possible currently sensed information in order to 
arrive to a posterior. A) The currently sensed information (in purple) has a smaller 
variance (uncertainty) than the prior (in yellow), and hence the mean of the resulting 
posterior distribution (in purple) will be closer to the mean of the currently sensed 
information. B) The prior is narrower than the currently sensed information, and so 
the mean of the posterior is closer to the mean of the prior. 
7 
 
Notice that in Equation 2 the information about the prior and the 
currently observed sensory information (likelihood) is weighted according to 
the respective relative reliabilities. For example, if the prior information is 
much more uncertain than the likelihood, i.e. if  2prior >> 
2
sensed (e.g. if we 
never interacted with that player before and we don’t know where he 
generally shoots to), then  2sensed /( 
2
sensed + 
2
prior) will be closer to zero and 
 2prior /( 
2
sensed +  
2
prior) closer to one, and consequently the prior will have 
little influence on the final estimate, which will be much closer to the 
currently observed sensory information. Graphically (see Figure 1.1-A), we 
can see how the posterior distribution will be closer to the distribution of the 
current sensory information. Alternatively, if the current sensory information 
is noisier than the prior information (e.g. in a foggy day), then the final 
estimate will be more biased towards the mean of the prior (Figure 1.1-B). 
Equation 2 has been used to experimentally calculate the weight 
given to current versus prior information and also to infer how uncertain 
someone feels about each of these pieces of information (Kording and 
Wolpert, 2004, 2006).  Assuming that the mean of the prior remains 
constant, one can give subjects sensory stimuli with different observed 
means. This allows one to create a linear regression of the subjects’ 
estimates (Xest) as a function of the observed sensory mean (sensed): 
  
      
       
 
       
        
        
      
 
       
        
         
 
 
The intercept of the linear regression (β0) would be equal to  
2
sensed /( 
2
sensed 
+ 2prior) prior. The slope of this linear regression (β1) characterizes how much 
β0 β1 
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the subject is weighting the current sensory information, and, if people 
perform according to the optimum prescribed by Bayesian statistics, its 
value should be equal to the perceived  2prior /( 
2
sensed + 
2
prior). A slope of 
zero indicates that subjects do not take into account current information, and 
a slope of one indicates that subjects only use current information. A slope 
between zero and one indicates that subjects are using information from 
both prior and current information, and the larger the slope the more they 
rely on the current sensory information and less on the prior. The slope of 
this linear regression, which we will call the Bayesian slope, tells us then 
how much the subject weights current relative to prior information. 
One can experimentally vary the uncertainty (variance) of the prior 
and/or the current information and calculate how much it changes subjects’ 
Bayesian slope (Kording and Wolpert, 2004, 2006, Tassinari et al., 2006, 
Beierholm et al., 2009, Berniker et al., 2010). These values can then be 
compared with what would be expected from Bayesian statistics: 
qualitatively, if people are performing according to Bayesian statistics, then 
this slope should increase with increased uncertainty in the prior and 
decreased uncertainty in the current information. Quantitatively, it should be 
near  2prior/( 
2
sensed+  
2
prior). Furthermore, if one assumes that subjects use a 
Bayesian strategy, it is also possible to infer subjects’ perceived uncertainty 
in prior and current sensory information (Kording and Wolpert, 2004). 
Another interesting property of Bayesian estimation is that the 
variance of the optimal estimate is equal to  2sensed  
2
prior /( 
2
sensed + 
2
prior), 
and hence its variance is lower2 than the variance of each piece of 
information (prior and current sensory observation) alone, i.e. 
 2sensed 
2
prior/( 
2
sensed+ 
2
prior) 
2
sensed and  
2
sensed 
2
prior /( 
2
sensed + 
2
prior) 
2
prior. 
This property of lower uncertainty in the final estimate is one of the crucial 
                                                          
2 Being only equal if one piece of information has no uncertainty, i.e. if  2prior=0 or  
2
sensed=0 
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advantages of behavior that combines different pieces of knowledge in a 
way predicted by Bayesian models. 
Models using Bayes rule have been used to explain many results in 
perception, action, neural coding and cognition (Ernst and Banks, 2002, 
Kording and Wolpert, 2006, Ma et al., 2006, Ma et al., 2009, Maia, 2009). 
Bayesian models that have been used in these contexts have many different 
forms. The differences between these models derive from distinct 
assumptions about the variables in the world and the way they relate to one 
another. Each model is then the unique consequence of one set of 
assumptions about the world. However, all these Bayesian models share 
the same basic principle that different pieces of information can be 
combined in order to estimate the relevant variables (Vilares and Kording, 
2011).  
 
1.3 Humans can combine current sensory information with prior 
knowledge 
There are many examples of the effect of prior knowledge in perception. For 
example, in Figure 1.2 we can see one concave groove and two convex 
bumps, but if we rotate the paper by 180 degrees their perceptual depth 
shifts (we see two grooves and one bump instead). This occurs because 
people have the prior assumption that light should come from above. This 
effect of prior knowledge is also beautifully illustrated in the Checker-
shadow illusion, where the prior assumption of a light source that casts the 
observed shadow makes the rectangles A and B appear to have different 
brightness (Adelson, 1995). These sensory biases can then be explained 
with the incorporation of prior information on the final sensory perception.  
Experimental studies have shown that priors can indeed be learned 
over time (Berniker et al., 2010) and that they are independent of the current 
sensory information (Beierholm et al., 2009). A diverse set of studies has 
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also shown that people often combine previously acquired knowledge (prior) 
with current sensory information (likelihood) in a way that is close to the 
optimum predicted by Bayesian statistics (but see Beck et al., 2012). For 
example, when performing arm-reaching tasks (Kording and Wolpert, 2004, 
Brouwer and Knill, 2009), pointing tasks (Tassinari et al., 2006) or even 
timing tasks (Miyazaki et al., 2005), people take into account both prior and 
likelihood information and, moreover, they do so in a way compatible with 
Bayesian statistics, giving more weight to the more reliable cue. In other 
words, they rely more on the prior when likelihood is a poor source of 
information and vice versa (Kording and Wolpert, 2004, Miyazaki et al., 
2005, Tassinari et al., 2006, Brouwer and Knill, 2009, Gerardin et al., 2010).  
If people are taking into account the uncertainty in both the prior and 
the likelihood, this means that the brain likely somehow represents these 
uncertainties. How does the nervous system then represent prior and 
likelihood and their associated uncertainties? Currently there is relatively 
little known about how the brain represents uncertainty (although some 
theories have been proposed, see subsection 1.5). When it comes to 
movement, it has been found that the dorsal premotor cortex and the 
primary motor cortex encode multiple potential reaching directions, 
indicating a potential representation of priors (Riehle and Requin, 1989, 
Bastian et al., 1998, Cisek and Kalaska, 2002, Bastian et al., 2003, Cisek 
and Kalaska, 2005). However, we clearly do not yet understand how the 
nervous system integrates priors and likelihoods, or where the respective 
uncertainties are represented.  
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Figure 1.2 - Examples of the effect of prior knowledge in current sensory 
perception. A) Example of a visual illusion. Here people generally see one groove 
(left) and two bumps, but if the paper is rotated 180° then two grooves and one 
bump are perceived. B) Checker-shadow illusion (Adelson, 1995). In this visual 
illusion, the rectangle A appears to be darker than B, while in reality they have the 
same color. 
 
1.4 Bayesian decision-making 
So far we have seen how prior and current sensory information can be 
combined, but that is only the first step in decision-making systems. In our 
example, after estimating the probabilities associated for each potential 
ball’s location, we have to choose how to try to defend it. Depending on the 
way we do that, we may incur a cost: For example if a ball is estimated to go 
in the corner of the goal, then it would be good to jump to it. If, on the other 
hand, it is estimated to be kicked in the center of the goal, then one should 
stay in place, and jumping to the corner may be costly. In the field of 
economics, the costs are generally described as negative utility, and the 
rewards as positive utility, where utility measures the subjective value of any 
possible situation. Decision theory deals with this problem of choosing the 
right action given uncertainty, generally by calculating the action that 
maximizes expected utility (Bentham, 1780). To make good decisions we 
need to combine our uncertain knowledge of the world with the potential 
rewards and costs we may encounter. 
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Sensorimotor research has shown that when human subjects are 
doing a movement task they are able to estimate their motor uncertainties 
(Christopoulos and Schrater, 2009), take into account both rewards and 
penalties associated with it, and aim their movements in a way that 
maximizes expected utility (Maloney et al., 2006). This is in contrast to many 
high-level economics tasks where human subjects exhibit a wide range of 
deviations from optimality (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, Ariely, 2008). 
To maximize expected utility our brain has to represent not only the 
uncertainty associated to each action but also its respective reward or cost 
value. The neural representation of these variables has been the focus of 
the emerging field of Neuroeconomics. Neuroeconomics tries to understand 
the neural processes that occur during decision-making within the 
framework of Bayesian decision theory (Glimcher, 2003, Wolpert, 2007, 
Beck et al., 2008). Responses to reward value and reward probability have 
been identified in neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex, striatum, amygdala and 
dopamine neurons of the midbrain (Cromwell and Schultz, 2003, Fiorillo et 
al., 2003, Gottfried et al., 2003, Tobler et al., 2005, Padoa-Schioppa and 
Assad, 2006, Paton et al., 2006).  
In recent years, research in neuroeconomics has been shifting focus 
from the mere coding of expected value and magnitude of reward to neural 
representations of reward uncertainty, both in the form of risk and of 
ambiguity. Uncertainty in reward has been hypothesized to be represented 
in some of the brain areas typically associated with reward coding, such as 
dopamine neurons (Fiorillo et al., 2003), the amygdala (Delazer et al., 
2010), the orbitofrontal cortex and the striatum (Preuschoff et al., 2006, 
Tobler et al., 2007) . However, it has been noted that neuronal activations 
related to uncertainty in reward (more specifically, to risk) seem to be 
segregated spatially and temporally from activations due to expected 
reward, with activations due to risk occurring later than the immediate 
activations due to expected reward (Preuschoff et al., 2006). Besides these 
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activations in reward-related areas, uncertainty in reward has also been 
associated with unique activations in the insula (Huettel et al., 2005, Singer 
et al., 2009) and in the cingulate cortex (McCoy and Platt, 2005, Rushworth 
and Behrens, 2008). Thus, reward value and risk have been associated with 
spatially and temporally distinct neural activations in specific brain areas, 
suggesting that the brain can use both sources of information to estimate 
expected utility and guide actions.  
Research in neuroeconomics has thus given us valuable 
suggestions about where uncertainty in reward can be represented in the 
brain. In this research, uncertainty is generally treated as one parameter, 
which can be considered the posterior uncertainty of a rewarding event. 
However, it does not differentiate between prior and current sensory 
uncertainty. In their experiments prior and current sensory uncertainty were 
perfectly correlated with posterior uncertainty, and were not distinguished as 
different sources of uncertainty. It is still unclear where prior and current 
sensory uncertainty are represented, and if they are represented in the 
same areas associated with uncertainty in reward. 
 
1.5 Theories on neural representations of uncertainty 
There are many different theories that have been proposed to describe how 
the brain may represent uncertainty (see Figure 1.3). For example, 
uncertainty can be encoded in a neuron’s tuning curve (Figure 1.3-A:C are 
examples of how changes in uncertainty could affect tuning curves). A 
tuning curve represents the average firing rate of the neuron as a function of 
relevant stimulus parameters (Butts and Goldman, 2006). There are at least 
two ways by which uncertainty could be encoded in a neuron’s tuning curve: 
either there are specialized neurons that encode uncertainty and nothing 
else (Figure 1.3-A) or alternatively neurons may have tuning curves 
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representing some other variable and encoding at the same time the 
uncertainty associated with that variable (Figure 1.3-B and Figure 1.3-C).  
The first theory depicted in Figure 1.3-A is the simplest: there may 
be a subset of neurons that only encode uncertainty, for example using 
neuromodulators such as dopamine, acetylcholine or norepinephrine (Yu 
and Dayan, 2005). This theory appears to have significant experimental 
support. For example, some experiments, as discussed above, indicate that 
uncertainty about reward appears to be represented by groups of 
dopaminergic neurons in the substantia nigra, insula, orbitofrontal cortex, 
cingulate cortex and amygdala (Fiorillo et al., 2003, Huettel et al., 2005, 
McCoy and Platt, 2005, Kepecs et al., 2008, Singer et al., 2009). However, 
even neurons in these areas have clear tuning to other variables. 
Furthermore, the experiments in support of this theory generally refer to high 
level uncertainty, such as the uncertainty associated with potential rewards, 
and not uncertainty that is related to say sensory or motor information, 
which can be considered more “low level uncertainty” and might be 
represented in a different way. 
A second possibility states that the width of the tuning curves may 
change with uncertainty (Anderson, 1994) and that the neurons may jointly 
encode probability distributions (Figure 1.3-B). Such a joint encoding could 
be plausible given that the visual system exhibits far more neurons than 
inputs (Van Essen et al., 1992) and the extra neurons could encode 
probability distributions instead of point estimates. In conditions of high 
uncertainty a broad set of neurons would be active but exhibit low activity. In 
contrast, when uncertainty is low, then only few neurons would be active, 
but these would have high firing rates (see Figure 1.3-B). Support for this 
theory comes from early visual physiology where spatial frequency tuning 
curves of neurons in the retina are larger during darkness (when there is 
more visual uncertainty) than during the day (Barlow et al., 1957). 
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A third influential theory of the encoding of uncertainty is the so-
called probabilistic population code, or PPC (Figure 1.3-C). This theory 
starts with the observation that the Poisson-like3 firing observed for most 
neurons automatically implies uncertainty about the stimulus that is driving a 
neuron (Ma et al., 2006). In this way, neurons transmit the stimulus 
information while at the same time jointly transmitting the uncertainty 
associated with that stimulus. Specifically, the standard versions of this 
theory predict that increased firing rates of neurons imply decreased levels 
of uncertainty. Some data in support of this theory comes from studies on 
cue combination (Gu et al., 2008, Morgan et al., 2008). More support comes 
from the general finding that early visual activity is higher when contrast is 
higher and thus uncertainty is lower (Shapley et al., 1981, Carandini and 
Heeger, 1994, Cheng et al., 1994). However, there is little experimental 
support for Poisson-like variability, and more advanced population decoding 
studies are needed. 
Another theory suggests that while the tuning curves stay the same 
the relative timing of signals may change (Figure 1.3-D)(Deneve, 2008, 
Huan and Rao, 2010). If uncertainty is low then neurons would have high 
firing rates and fire rapidly when a stimulus is given, but would more quickly 
stop firing. If, on the other hand, uncertainty is high, then neurons would 
have lower firing rates but fire for a longer time. In that way, the total number 
of spikes could be the same, but their relative timing would change. There is 
some evidence for this theory coming from studies in the area MT that 
shows differential temporal modulation when animals are more uncertain 
(Bair and Koch, 1996). 
Another theory is the sampling hypothesis (Hinton and Sejnowski, 
1983, Hoyer and Hyvärinen, 2003, Fiser et al., 2010, Berkes et al., 2011). 
                                                          
3 i.e. if the firing of the neuron follows a Poisson-like distribution. 
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According to this theory, neurons will spike a range of instantaneous firing 
rates that is narrow over time if the nervous system is certain about a 
variable and has a wider range if it is less certain (see Figure 1.3-E). 
Evidence for the sampling hypothesis comes from some recent experiments 
comparing the statistics of neuronal firing across different situations (Kenet 
et al., 2003, Fiser et al., 2004). However, no experiments to our knowledge 
have explicitly changed probabilities and measured the resulting neuronal 
variability.  
Finally, it is possible that uncertainty could be encoded not in the 
firing properties of neurons but in the connections between them (see Figure 
1.3-F), for example in the number and strength of synapses between them 
(Wu and Amari, 2003). This type of uncertainty coding could for example 
apply to the representation of uncertainty in priors, as priors are acquired 
over long periods of time and thus there is a need to store information in a 
more durable way. Uncertainty, in this case, would thus change the way that 
neurons interact with one another.  
Although all these theories provide interesting suggestions for how 
the nervous system could represent uncertainty, so far available 
experimental data does not clearly support one theory over any of the 
others. More importantly, these theories (portrayed in Figure 1.3) are not 
mutually exclusive. The nervous system may use any or all of these 
mechanisms to encode uncertainty at the same time, and use different types 
of coding for different types of uncertainty. It is thus important to try to 
acquire more experimental data on how different types of uncertainty may 
be represented in the brain. 
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Figure 1.3 - Possible neural representations of uncertainty. In red are the 
putative firing rates (or connections) in a low-uncertainty state and in blue the ones 
occurring in a high-uncertainty state. Panels A trough F represent different theories 
that have been proposed on how the brain could be representing uncertainty. 
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1.6 Social uncertainty 
One big source of uncertainty in decision-making is other people’s behavior. 
In our example, after estimating the probabilities associated with each 
potential ball’s location, understanding the available courses of action (e.g. 
going left or right) and incorporating the likely rewards and costs associated 
with each of them, one can choose the action that maximizes expected 
utility (Bentham, 1780). However, when interacting with other people, the 
outcomes of our decisions/actions will also depend on the behavior of 
others, which is to a certain extent unknown for us. For example, another 
player can place himself between you and the ball, preventing you from 
reaching it. Or the player from the other team that is kicking the ball 
purposefully pretends to be throwing the ball to the right, while ending up 
throwing to the left. If we take into account other people’s behavior we can 
formulate more accurate predictions of the outcomes of our actions 
(Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994), and in this way make decisions that lead to 
better outcomes. 
 
1.6.1 Trust  
As we saw with non-social events, making predictions of the behavior of 
other people implies combining prior knowledge, or expectations, with 
current observable information. Current observable information, however, is 
uncertain, either because not enough evidence could be gathered and/or 
because this evidence could have multiple interpretations (Hinde and 
Groebel, 1991). This is especially true in the case of one-shot interactions, 
in which no a priori information is known about the person we are interacting 
with (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994). One has then to incorporate prior 
beliefs or expectations when making the predictions. Trust can be defined 
as having the prior belief that the person we are interacting with will promote 
our best interests and will not betray us (Simpson, 2007). Trust is then a 
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positive expectation in the face of uncertainty emerging from social relations 
(Guseva and Rona-Tas, 2001).  
Trust facilitates cooperation with others and exists to some degree in 
all human interaction, being the basis of a productive and healthy society 
(Camerer, 2003, Krueger et al., 2007). It facilitates organization in both 
permanent and temporary work groups and is associated with higher job 
satisfaction, lower labor cost and larger profits (Meyerson et al., 1996, 
Knack and Keefer, 1997, Gambetta, 2000, Chami and Fullenkamp, 2001). It 
is also the basis of fulfilling and secure human relationships (Simpson, 
2007, Luchies et al., 2013). Trust can be seen in a diverse array of 
situations, and over a variety of things: people entrust money to insurance 
companies, hoping that they will help them in return if the time comes; they 
trust physical effort, for example by helping a friend move; and they even 
trust their own lives to complete strangers, every time they step into a bus or 
plane that is not driven or piloted by them. Furthermore, while traditionally 
people would mainly live and interact in small communities, and so long-
term repeated interactions would allow trust to be built over time, in the 
current global market these long-term repeated exchanges between 
relatives or neighbors are being slowly replaced by one-time interactions 
between anonymous partners (Nowak and Sigmund, 2005). A better 
understanding of how trust operates in different contexts in one-shot 
interactions may then be of special relevance to the current economy. 
 
1.6.2 Game theory 
Game theory provides a collection of rigorous models that were developed 
to understand and explain situations in which two people (decision-makers) 
must interact, and in which each person choice behavior will affect the 
outcome of other player (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994, Camerer, 2003, 
Sanfey, 2007). It offers a rich source of both behavioral tasks and data, in 
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addition to well-specified models for the investigation of social exchange 
(Sanfey, 2007). Although it was first used in economics, it has now been 
employed in a wide variety of fields, including sociology, evolutionary 
biology and the emerging field of neuroeconomics (Osborne and Rubinstein, 
1994, Camerer, 2003, Sanfey, 2007). Given its mathematic basis, it allows 
for quantitative predictions of how idealized players should behave, and 
deviations from this “optimal behavior” can give insights into people’s 
internal motivations, cognitive limitations and prior expectations (Camerer, 
2003). 
In game theory, the basic entity is a “player”, and a “game” contains 
a specification of the actions each player has available to them, the 
information players have (complete or incomplete), the order in which they 
choose their actions (e.g. all at the same time or not) and the possible 
outcomes (“utilities”) associated with each set of actions (Osborne and 
Rubinstein, 1994, Camerer, 2003). For each game it is possible to calculate 
the Nash Equilibrium, i.e. the set of actions from which no player can benefit 
from changing unilaterally his or hers action (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994, 
Camerer, 2003). The Nash equilibrium tells us what a player should do, i.e. 
what is the optimal or best response given the behavior of the other players, 
assuming that the player is “rational” (just interested in maximizing their own 
payoff). However, in practice many times people deviate from what would be 
expected under the Nash equilibrium, being less selfish and strategic that 
the game theoretical models predict (Sanfey, 2007). The way people deviate 
from the Nash equilibrium can then, as referred, give valuable information 
about people’s internal motivations and prior expectations, and the formal 
modeling approach and well-characterized tasks given by Game Theory 
provide a very useful foundation for the study of decisions in a social context 
(Sanfey, 2007). 
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1.6.3 Trust games 
Game theory offers a simplified way to define trust and measure it, by using 
the trust game depicted in Figure 1.4. In a trust game, one person (the 
investor, or trustor) receives a given amount of money, and can choose to 
invest some part of it. The amount invested is then multiplied by some factor 
higher than 1 (symbolizing a return on social investment) and given to the 
other player (the trustee). The trustee can then decide how much of this 
increased amount to give back to the trustor, keeping the rest (Berg et al., 
1995, Camerer, 2003). From a rational choice point of view, if the trustor 
does invest money, this represents a belief that the expected return will be 
positive. The amount of money invested is then a measure of the trust 
deposited on the trustee, and the money given back by the trustee is a 
measure of reciprocity.  
Many studies have used trust games and the results have been 
contrary to what would be expected under the assumption of purely self-
interested individuals, who act in order to maximize their own payoff 
(Camerer and Fehr, 2002). In fact, if the trust game is played only once 
(one-shot game), the unique Nash equilibrium for rational purely selfish 
players is for the trustee to give no money back, and so for the trustor 
(anticipating that) to invest nothing (Camerer, 2003, King-Casas et al., 
2005). Nevertheless, studies have consistently shown that people do trust 
and reciprocate, even at a cost to their gains (Berg et al., 1995, Fehr and 
Gachter, 2000, Camerer, 2003). However, these results were mainly 
obtained using exchanges of money, and it is unclear if they are only 
applicable to monetary transactions, or if this “monetary trust” indeed 
represents a general positive expectation in the face of social uncertainty 
(Levitt and List, 2007). 
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Figure 1.4 - Schematic representation of a trust game. The Investor receives 
money in the beginning of the experiment and can decide, from that money, to send 
an amount I to the trustee, keeping the rest. The amount invested is then multiplied 
by a factor  (which is higher than 1) and given to the trustee. The trustee can then 
decide which fraction of this increased amount (I) to give back to the trustor, and 
keeps the rest. 
 
1.7 This thesis: objectives and outline 
This thesis is aimed at better understanding how the human brain deals with 
decision-making under uncertainty. We start by asking which areas of the 
brain represent uncertainty in prior knowledge and current sensory 
information, and how they are combined (chapter 2). We continue by trying 
to understand the specific role of putamen and the neuromodulator 
dopamine in this process (chapter 3). We finish by analyzing decision-
making under uncertainty in social settings, and if the way people react to it 
can be generalized across monetary and movement-effort situations 
(chapter 4).  
In chapter 2, we look for neural correlates of prior and likelihood 
uncertainty. Indeed, although many behavioral studies have shown that 
people can take into account both types of uncertainty (see section 1.3), and 
that this is essential for optimal decision-making (see sections 1.2 and 1.3), 
surprisingly little is known of where in the brain these types of uncertainty 
are represented. We develop a decision-making task in which both prior and 
likelihood uncertainties are varied independently, and use fMRI to look for 
differential neural activations. We find neural representations of both types 
of uncertainty, but in very distinct locations. We discuss these results and 
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also refer the specific case of the putamen, which is not only more active 
with increased prior uncertainty, but also correlates with subjects’ 
tendencies to sense and attend to current versus prior information 
The role of the putamen in decision-making under uncertainty is 
further explored in chapter 3. Moreover, given that the neuromodulator 
dopamine is one of the main neurotransmitters from the putamen and has 
previously been implicated in decision-making under uncertainty (Friston, 
2009, Friston et al., 2012), we also analyze the specific role of dopamine in 
this process. By administering the same decision-making task described 
above to both age-matched controls and patients with Parkinson’s disease, 
in whom activity from the putamen is compromised due to a lack of 
dopamine (Kish et al., 1988, Lotharius and Brundin, 2002), we can 
disentangle the specific role of dopaminergic activity from the putamen. We 
find that some aspects of decision-making under uncertainty are conserved 
across patients and controls, but that patients are less sensitive to 
differences in likelihood uncertainty. We conclude by discussing a possible 
function of dopaminergic activity from the putamen in the processing of 
uncertainty in the current stimulus. 
In chapter 4, we analyze decision-making under uncertainty in social 
settings. More specifically, we analyze trust, which can be considered a 
positive expectation in the face of social uncertainty, and ask if the way 
people trust can be generalized across monetary and movement-effort 
situations. We develop a movement effort version of the trust game, which is 
generally used in game theory to study trust, and compare it to the typical 
monetary trust game. We find no difference in subjects’ decision to trust or 
reciprocate between both conditions. Moreover, we find a high positive 
correlation in subjects’ behavior across conditions. We discuss these 
results, suggesting that the way people deal with social uncertainty may be 
a character trait. 
Finally, in chapter 5 we summarize and discuss the findings obtained 
with this thesis. We also consider limitations and implications of the thesis, 
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and future avenues of research that could be explored in decision-making 
under uncertainty. 
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2.1 Summary 
Background: Uncertainty shapes our perception of the world and the 
decisions we make. Two aspects of uncertainty are commonly 
distinguished: uncertainty in previously acquired knowledge (prior) and 
uncertainty in current sensory information (likelihood). Previous studies have 
established that humans can take both types of uncertainty into account, 
often in a way predicted by Bayesian statistics. However, the neural 
representations underlying these parameters remain poorly understood.  
Results: By varying prior and likelihood uncertainty in a decision-making 
task while performing neuroimaging in humans, we found that prior and 
likelihood uncertainty had quite distinct representations. While likelihood 
uncertainty activated brain regions along the early stages of the visuomotor 
pathway, representations of prior uncertainty were identified in specialized 
brain areas outside this pathway, including putamen, amygdala, insula, and 
orbitofrontal cortex. Furthermore, the magnitude of brain activity in the 
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putamen predicted individuals’ personal tendencies to rely more on either 
prior or current information.  
Conclusions: Our results suggest different pathways by which prior and 
likelihood uncertainty map onto the human brain, and provide a potential 
neural correlate for higher reliance on current or prior knowledge. Overall, 
these findings offer insights into the neural pathways that may allow humans 
to make decisions close to the optimal defined by a Bayesian statistical 
framework. 
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“In this world nothing can be said to be certain, except death and taxes.” 
      Benjamin Franklin 
 
2.2 Introduction 
Uncertainty is intrinsic to our world. For any given event, there is uncertainty 
in what our senses currently tell us – this is usually denoted likelihood 
uncertainty. There is also uncertainty in our preexisting knowledge of that 
event – this is known as prior uncertainty. For example, when judging the 
probability of rain, we combine current information obtained through our 
senses (are there clouds visible in the sky?) with previous acquired 
knowledge we possess about the chance of rain at our particular location 
(are we in Lisbon or London?). In such cases, the uncertainty associated 
with each piece of information determines how we should combine them. 
The combination of information gathered in the past (prior) with new 
information (likelihood) is critical for effective decision-making (Cox, 1946) 
and can thus be seen as a central objective of the nervous system. 
 Bayesian statistics describe how prior and likelihood information can 
be optimally combined as a function of their respective uncertainties to give 
a posterior probability estimate. The uncertainty of this optimal estimate 
(posterior uncertainty, or general uncertainty) is generally smaller than the 
uncertainty associated with either prior or likelihood alone (Glimcher, 2003). 
Several recent studies comparing Bayesian predictions to human behavior 
show that humans are close to optimal in a wide range of tasks, including 
estimation (Miyazaki et al., 2005), learning(Burge et al., 2008) and 
movement (Kording and Wolpert, 2004, Tassinari et al., 2006, Graves et al., 
2010). The fact that behavior was close to the Bayesian optimal in these 
tasks indicates that human participants detect and use information about 
both prior and likelihood uncertainty. Nevertheless, in spite of a large body 
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of behavioral research, it is still unclear how and where these types of 
uncertainty are represented in the brain. 
Given that uncertainty is fundamental to behavior, there is an 
extensive modeling literature that hypothesizes how it could be represented. 
However, these different theoretical models do not tend to distinguish 
between the representation of priors and likelihoods. Also, they differ in their 
predictions of where uncertainty should be represented (Ma et al., 2006, 
Preuschoff et al., 2006, Schultz et al., 2008, Singer et al., 2009, Fiser et al., 
2010). One set of theories assumes that uncertainty is a fundamental part of 
the way any pair of neurons exchanges information, and thus the 
representation of the uncertainty of a variable is always co-localized with the 
representation of the variable itself (Ma et al., 2006, Fiser et al., 2010). A 
different set of theories assumes that there are specialized brain regions 
that encode and process uncertainty (Hsu et al., 2005, Preuschoff et al., 
2006, Schultz et al., 2008, Singer et al., 2009). Although these theories are 
not necessarily mutually exclusive, they offer different predictions, and none 
so far has received strong neurobiological support. It thus remains unknown 
whether uncertainty is represented along the sensorimotor pathway or within 
specialized brain areas outside this pathway, and whether different forms of 
uncertainty have different representations. 
To try to find the neural correlates of uncertainty, several studies in 
monkeys have analyzed how uncertainty in a stimulus can change neural 
firing. For instance, in a classic visual discrimination task, monkeys view a 
cloud of randomly moving dots and need to identify their net direction (Gold 
and Shadlen, 2001, Shadlen and Newsome, 2001). Varying the percentage 
of dots with a coherent motion demonstrated that the activity of neurons in 
the lateral intraparietal area (LIP) represents not only the direction of the 
stimulus but also the uncertainty associated with it(Shadlen and Newsome, 
2001). Such studies can be interpreted as changing the likelihood. Other 
studies have changed the probability that even before seeing the stimulus a 
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monkey would have to saccade to a given target, and found that this 
modulated neuronal activity (Basso and Wurtz, 1997). These studies can be 
interpreted as changing the prior (Gold and Shadlen, 2001). However, all of 
these studies are based on relatively simple oculomotor tasks, with a focus 
on very specific brain areas. It remains poorly understood whether neural 
representations of uncertainty are also encoded elsewhere in the brain, and 
whether the findings in monkeys translate to other experimental tasks and 
settings in humans. 
 Interesting recent human studies in neuroeconomics have started to 
examine how uncertainty about reward is represented. These studies show 
that increased uncertainty about whether a reward is going to be obtained 
(risk) correlates with increased activations in the orbitofrontal cortex 
(OFC)(Critchley et al., 2001, Tobler et al., 2007) , midbrain (Preuschoff et 
al., 2006), cingulate cortex (Critchley et al., 2001, Behrens et al., 2007) , and 
insula (Huettel et al., 2005, for a review, see Rangel et al., 2008, Schultz et 
al., 2008). However, in all these cases uncertainty was treated as one single 
parameter, and thus general uncertainty was perfectly correlated with prior 
or likelihood uncertainty, which were not distinguished as separate sources 
of uncertainty. Thus, although in humans there is an increasing knowledge 
of where uncertainty in reward is represented, it is still unclear where prior 
and likelihood uncertainty are, and if these areas coincide with the areas 
involved in uncertainty in reward. 
Here we devised a sensory-motor decision-making task in which 
human subjects could use both prior and likelihood to estimate positions of 
hidden visual targets. Uncertainty was systematically varied on each trial in 
a two-by-two factorial design, such that two of the conditions were matched 
for performance accuracy but differed in the relative balance of prior and 
likelihood uncertainty. By combining event-related functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) approaches with computational models of 
behavioral performance, we were able to characterize the neural 
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representations of the two kinds of uncertainty while controlling for 
confounds related to expected reward. The behavioral results indicate that 
subjects are adept at using both kinds of uncertainty to optimize 
performance, in keeping with Bayesian predictions. The imaging results 
suggest that likelihood uncertainty is primarily represented in the early 
stages of the sensorimotor network, while prior uncertainty is represented in 
limbic and paralimbic decision-related areas outside of traditional 
sensorimotor pathways. Together these findings suggest fundamentally 
different representations by which prior and likelihood uncertainty in a 
decision-making task map onto the human brain. 
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2.3 Materials and methods 
 
 
Figure 2.1 - Experimental setup. (A) Illustration of the task. Subjects guess the 
position of a hidden target (the “coin”, represented by the yellow dot) using a net 
(vertical blue bar) which they can displace horizontally. At the onset of each trial, 
subjects receive noisy information about the position of the hidden target in the form 
of a set of 5 blue dots (the likelihood). Subjects then move the net to the guessed 
position and press the mouse button to confirm their choice, after which the true 
target position is displayed. A new trial then begins 1500 ms later. Left: illustration of 
the computer display that was presented to the subjects. Right: typical time course 
of a trial. (B) The 4 conditions of the experiment. The experiment consisted of a two-
by-two factorial design, with two types of prior (p=narrow prior; P=wide prior) and 
two types of likelihood (l=narrow likelihood; L=wide likelihood). The wider conditions 
are the ones with more associated uncertainty. 
 
 
Subjects. Twenty-seven healthy subjects (12 women; age range 19-35 
years; mean age=27 years) participated in the experiment. Of these, 17 
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participated in the fMRI experiment, from which data from 15 were used (9 
women). All participants were right-handed, had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision, were naive to the goals of the experiment, signed consent 
forms and were paid to participate. Subjects that only performed the 
behavioral part of the experiment were paid $20. Subjects that performed 
both the behavioral and the fMRI parts of the experiment were paid $70. All 
protocols were approved by the Northwestern University IRB. 
 
Behavioral task. Subjects performed a decision-making task, which 
consisted of guessing the position of a hidden coin on a screen, in a task 
similar to one described in prior studies (Tassinari et al., 2006, Berniker et 
al., 2010). Subjects were told the cover story of a coin being tossed into a 
pond and informed that their task was to guess where the coin had fallen. 
They could not see the coin, but they could see 5 blue dots that were the 
“splashes” produced by the coin falling in. They were told that the person 
who threw the coin aimed, albeit imperfectly, at the center of the screen 
(mean of prior). They were also told that, between blocks, the thrower 
changed, and the new one might be better or worse at throwing (i.e. they 
were indirectly informed that the variance of the prior changed). To estimate 
the coin position, subjects could use (although they were never explicitly told 
so) both the coin position’s likelihood, obtained from the “splashes”, and its 
prior (the distribution of previous coin locations). There was no temporal 
deadline. 
 
Stimuli. The position of the coin was drawn from a Gaussian distribution, 
centered on the center of the screen with a standard deviation (std) that was 
either low ( p=2.5% of screen width) or high ( P=8.5% of screen width). This 
distribution was the prior of the experiment. Subjects were given the mean 
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of the prior (“the coin throw is aimed at the screen center”) but not its 
variance, which they could only estimate from the distribution of previous 
coin throws. The standard deviation of the prior was kept constant within 
blocks, but changed across blocks. On every trial, a cluster of five dots was 
shown on the screen. The x-position of each of these dots was drawn 
independently from a second Gaussian distribution in which the mean was 
the coin’s horizontal location on that trial and the standard deviation was 
either low ( l=6%) or high ( L=15%). The distribution of these five dots 
defined the likelihood. The std of the likelihood was varied pseudo-randomly 
from trial to trial but counterbalanced across trials. We made the std of the 
likelihood vary pseudorandom from trial to trial so that subjects could not 
predict a priori the overall uncertainty that the trial would have. In total there 
were thus four conditions: low prior uncertainty and low likelihood 
uncertainty (pl); low prior uncertainty and high likelihood uncertainty (pL); 
high prior uncertainty and low likelihood uncertainty (Pl) and high prior 
uncertainty and high likelihood uncertainty (PL).  
The likelihood dots were displayed as blue dots against a gray 
background (see Figure 2.1-A). The coin appeared as a yellow dot. The 
background was light grey with darker grey dots dispersed randomly. These 
darker grey dots, however, never changed location. This particular 
background was chosen to minimize possible effects on the fMRI data 
related to edge effects. All dots had the same diameter. The screen units 
were normalized between 0 (the left edge) and 1 (the right edge). Stimulus 
presentation, for both the lab portion and the scanning session, was 
performed using Matlab 7.4.0 (MathWorks, Natick, MA). 
 
Choosing the parameters – matching of performance. The std values 
were chosen such that, on average, people would perform with identical 
accuracy in the pL and the Pl conditions. For that, different std values were 
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tested on an individual level for a small number of pilot subjects, until these 
subjects performed with identical accuracy in the pL and Pl conditions. This 
gave us a specific set of parameters which we then used for the main 
experiment. We decided to use the same set of parameters for all following 
subjects because: (1) to make subject-by-subject matches of performance 
by finding the appropriate parameter values for them would require 
potentially more than triple the experimental time, and even then there 
would be significant remaining uncertainty. In order to maintain a tolerable 
experimental duration that is not overly taxing for subjects, matching on the 
basis of group averages is a distinct advantage.  (2) Having different 
parameter values for different subjects would statistically complicate group 
comparisons. 
 
Procedure: Behavioral session. Experimental blocks: At the onset of each 
trial, five blue likelihood dots were shown on the screen, where they 
remained until the end of the trial. Subjects had to move a blue vertical bar 
(the “net”) with a trackball mouse to estimate the coin position and press the 
right mouse button once they made their decision. Subjects could take as 
long as they wanted to decide where to place the net but had to wait for at 
least 1.26 seconds. After they pressed the button, the true position of the 
coin was revealed and subjects would get one point added to the score if 
the coin was inside the net. The cumulative score across the experiment 
was shown to the subjects at the end of each trial. A new trial would then 
begin 1.5 seconds later (see Figure 2.1-A). Given that the net covered the 
entire height of the screen only the horizontal location was relevant, making 
this a one-dimensional estimation task.  Subjects completed four blocks of 
150 trials each for a total of 600 trials per experiment. Each block was 
characterized by a particular std of the prior. Half of the subjects started with 
the low prior std condition and the other half started with the high prior std 
condition. After the four blocks, subjects also performed 100 trials of a 
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control block. Each subject thus had to perform 700 trials. Each trial took an 
average 4 seconds and the total experiment lasted on average 
approximately one hour. 
Control Block: The control block was performed immediately following 
completion of the four experimental blocks, on those subjects that were 
rapid to complete the main block (n=11). The task was identical to the main 
experiment, with the only difference being that the coin’s location was 
shown at the onset of each trial and could be seen throughout, so there was 
no uncertainty about its position. The 100 trials comprising the control block 
were selected by randomly sampling 25 trials per condition from the main 
experiment blocks. Each trial of the control block repeated one of those 
sampled experimental trials, showing the same likelihood dot display that 
was shown in the experimental trial and using as the coin position the actual 
position to which the person moved the net at that trial. As in the main 
experiment, subjects were awarded one point for successfully moving the 
net to the coin’s position.  
 
Procedure: fMRI session. From the 27 subjects recruited for the behavioral 
task, 17 were asked to return and perform the same task while undergoing 
fMRI. The choice of which subjects would also do the fMRI part of the 
experiment depended mainly on subjects and scanner times availability. If, 
however, more than one subject was available for the same scanner time 
slot, then the one chosen to participate would be the one in which more 
behavioral difference between the different conditions was observed. This 
was done in order to maximize statistical power. Note that for the fMRI part 
of the experiment we were interested in the neural representations of prior 
and likelihood uncertainty and not if they were or not behaving in a Bayes-
like way. The task was identical to the one performed in the behavioral 
experiment, minimizing the need for new learning. Because it was the 
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second time they performed the same task, it was assumed that after the 
start of each block they rapidly converged to the correct prior(Berniker et al., 
2010). The four experimental blocks were performed in succession with a 2-
minute break in between each one.  At the end of the experiment a T1-
weighted anatomical scan was acquired. Data from two of the 17 subjects 
could not be included in the analysis due to technical problems in the 
scanner, and for one other subject, data from only two of the four blocks 
were acquired due to technical problems (but because the 2 blocks had 
different prior uncertainties, the four types of trials were equally 
represented). Due to technical issues and time constraints, data from the 
control block were only obtained in 11 of the subjects. Thus, in total, data 
from 15 subjects were used in the main experiment and data from 11 of 
them were used in the control task. 
 
Data Analysis:  
Bayesian modeling of behavior. In order to perform the task successfully, 
for every trial the subjects should place the net in the most likely location of 
the hidden coin. Bayes rule provides an optimal way to estimate this 
location(Kording and Wolpert, 2004): 
Xest= 
2
L/( 
2
L+  
2
P)P+ 
2
P/( 
2
L+  
2
P)L  (1) 
where Xest is the estimated position of the coin,  
2
L and  
2
P are the 
variances of the likelihood and of the prior, respectively, and L and P are 
the respective means. For our experiment, the real P (the mean of the 
prior) is always a constant, in this case 0.5 (the center of the screen). The 
mean of the likelihood (L) for each particular trial can be considered the 
centroid of the cloud of dots, and it changes from trial to trial. We can then 
make a linear regression of the subject’s estimated coin position, Xest, as a 
function of the centroid of the cloud of dots (see Figure 2.2-A). The slope of 
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this linear regression characterizes how much the subject is weighting the 
likelihood information, and, if people perform according to the optimum 
prescribed by Bayesian statistics, its value should be equal to the perceived 
 
2
P/( 
2
L+  
2
P). A slope of zero suggests that subjects do not take into 
account likelihood information, and a slope of one suggests that subjects 
only use likelihood information. A slope between zero and one indicates that 
subjects are using information from both prior and likelihood, and the larger 
the slope the more they rely on the likelihood and less on the prior.  
 
Subjects’ mean of the prior: The intercept from this linear regression (β0) 
should be equal to the perceived  2L/( 
2
L+  
2
P)P. Thus, to estimate the 
mean of the prior that the subjects were using, and given that  2L/( 
2
L+ 
 
2
P)=1- 
2
P/( 
2
L+  
2
P)=1- slope, subjects mean of the prior can be calculated 
by: P= β0/(1- slope).  
 
Subjects’ average reliance on likelihood vs. prior information: For the 
correlation between fMRI signal and individual behavior tendencies, the 
slopes associated with each trial type were averaged to get an estimate of 
an individual’s average reliance on likelihood information.  
 
Subjects’ performance: The proportion of correct trials, for each condition, 
was calculated as the number of trials in which the subject accurately 
guessed the position of the coin, divided by the total number of trials in that 
condition.  
For the behavioral calculations, the first 50 trials of every block were 
discarded to minimize the effect of learning. 
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Optimal values:  The Bayesian optimal values for the slopes can be 
obtained from  2P/( 
2
L+  
2
P), where  
2
P is the variance associated with the 
prior (with  2p=0.025
2 or  2P = 0.085
2 in unit-less screen coordinates) and  2L 
is the variance associated with the likelihood, which can be estimated by 
 
2
L= variance (cloud of dots)/ number of dots (so in our case,  
2
l=0.06
2/5 or 
 
2
L = 0.15
2/5). 
 
Instantaneous Bayesian slope: We can also take Equation 1 and rearrange 
it to give us the “instantaneous Bayesian slope”, i.e. how much the subject is 
taking the likelihood information into account on each trial. If we denote this 
slope by s, then we can rewrite the equation as: 
Xest=(1 - s )P+ s L  (2) 
Which gives us the slope per trial : 
s = (Xest -P )/(L -P )   (3) 
This slope will also give us 0 if Xest =P (i.e. if the subject puts the cursor at 
the mean of the prior) and 1 if Xest =L (i.e. if the subject puts the cursor at 
the mean of the likelihood). However, this slope value gets unstable when L 
and P are very close together (i.e. when L -P approaches zero). 
Therefore, in the “instantaneous Bayesian slope” model we used instead the 
arctangent of this measure, namely , so to have a 
measure bounded by 0 and 1. 
 
Sensitivity to prior change: This is measured as the average absolute 
difference between the slope at the end of one block and the slope at the 
beginning of the new block (which has a different prior uncertainty). To 
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calculate each slope the last/first 20 trials of the block were used. To 
capture real sensitivity to prior change, and not learned effects, and also to 
minimize any circularity, the values used were the ones obtained during the 
lab portion of the experiment (when they were first exposed to the task). 
 
fMRI data acquisition and processing. Whole-brain imaging was 
performed on a 3-Tesla Siemens Trio MR scanner, using a 32-channel head 
coil.  Functional data were acquired using a gradient-echo echo-planar 
scanning sequence (repetition time = 2.76 sec, echo time = 20 ms; 44 axial 
slices; matrix size = 128  120 voxels; field-of-view = 220  206 mm; in-
plane resolution = 1.72  1.72 mm; slice thickness = 2 mm; gap = 1 mm; flip 
angle = 75°), using a 32-channel head coil. All functional images were 
acquired in a single session that lasted about one hour with some variation 
due to response times. Participants were placed in a light head restraint 
within the scanner to limit head movement. Visual stimuli were projected on 
a screen and were viewed through a mirror attached to the head coil. After 
the acquisition of functional images, a high-resolution T1-weighted 
anatomical scan was obtained, which were later coregistered to the mean 
functional image of each subject, normalized to a standard template image, 
and averaged across subjects to aid in localization of observed brain 
activations. All of the fMRI images shown throughout the paper have been 
overlaid on this averaged T1 (in which only the T1 scans of 8 of the subjects 
were used, due to technical difficulties). 
The first six brain images acquired in each fMRI run were discarded 
to allow for T1-weighted signal equilibration. Scan onset times varied 
relative to stimulus onset times (trial start). Image processing and statistical 
analyses were performed using Statistical Parametric Mapping software 
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). All functional images for a given subject 
were realigned to the first volume of the first run to correct for head 
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movement, normalized to a standard echo planar imaging (EPI) template, 
and spatially smoothed using a 6-mm  (full width at half-maximum) 
Gaussian kernel.  
 
fMRI data analysis.  For every participant, a standard rapid event-related 
fMRI approach was used, in which the onset of each trial type (4 different 
trial types in our experiment) was convolved with a canonical hemodynamic 
response function and then regressed against the measured fMRI signal 
(Josephs and Henson, 1999). Because each trial type appeared in a 
random order and had a different duration (controlled by the subject, but not 
less than 2.76s), the fMRI responses to the rapidly presented events could 
be separated without the need to wait for the hemodynamic response to 
return to baseline(Josephs and Henson, 1999) after each trial. The onset 
times were generally considered as the beginning of each trial, except for 
the reward/no-reward model, in which the onset times corresponded to the 
time in which the subject had already made a response and was shown the 
real position of the coin. The general linear model was first estimated at the 
single-subject level and it contained: one regressor for each of the four trial 
types (pl, pL, Pl, PL), separated by prior-type block (therefore, in each block, 
only two trial types existed); six nuisance regressors per block that 
corresponded to participant-specific head-movement parameters; and 
regressors encoding the average BOLD response at each of the 
experimental blocks. For the parametric likelihood uncertainty model, the 
“instantaneous Bayesian slope” model and the reward model all blocks were 
concatenated as one combined block, and 3 additional nuisance variables 
were included to minimize block/session effects. The parameter estimates 
(beta values) that were estimated from this general linear model reflect the 
strength of covariance between the canonical hemodynamic response 
function and the brain activation for a given condition(Friston et al., 1995). 
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Contrast images, derived from a pair-wise contrast between each 
trial type and an implicit baseline, were then taken to a second-level group 
analysis into a repeated-measures ANOVA (“flexible factorial”; to study the 
effects of each trial type) or a paired t-test (to study potential reward effects) 
or a simple t-test (to study potential parametric likelihood uncertainty effects 
or the potential existence of an area that tracked the “instantaneous 
Bayesian slope”). Throughout, the statistical threshold was set to p=0.05 
family-wise error corrected for multiple comparisons over the entire brain 
volume. All areas that are reported (see also Sup. Tables in the Appendix of 
this thesis) survive the corrected thresholds at the peak and/or cluster level. 
The anatomical localization of the local maxima was aided with reference to 
a human brain atlas (Duvernoy, 1999).  
Cross-validation: Although the voxel selection procedure outlined above 
does not give rise to any circularity, if we were to simply plot the values for 
percent signal change using the model data that generated our brain maps 
there would be some circularity between voxel identification from voxel 
plotting(Jazayeri and Shadlen, 2010). In order to minimize such circularity, 
the values for percent signal change (PSC) shown in Figure 2.3-B and 
Figure 2.5-B were extracted using a cross-validation leave-one-out 
procedure (similar to what is reported in Ref. Glascher et al., 2010): the 
flexible-factorial from the second-level analysis was re-estimated but leaving 
out one subject. For the different regions of interest, the new maximum 
coordinates for this second-level analysis were extracted. The beta values 
for these new voxels were extracted from the left-out subject, thereby 
minimizing subject independence between voxel selection and voxel 
plotting. This procedure was iterated fifteen times, each time with a different 
subject “left-out”. The statistical threshold was set at p<0.05 for the cross-
validation procedure.  
We also performed a two-fold cross-validation method, in which instead of 
taking away one subject at a time, we randomly divided the subject pool in 
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half, used half for localization and extracted the beta values from the 
remaining half of the subjects. The same basic results were found than in 
the leave-one out cross-validation procedure: there was a significant effect 
of prior and not of likelihood in the right and left putamen, right amygdala, 
left insula and right OFC; and a significant effect of likelihood and not prior in 
the occipital cortex. 
Note that, because there was no true zero baseline (e.g. a condition with no 
prior uncertainty), what matters is the relative difference in the beta 
values/percent signal change between the different conditions. 
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2.4 Results 
In this study we wanted to know where prior and likelihood uncertainty are 
represented in the human brain. To this end, we developed a visual 
decision-making task in which subjects had to guess the position of a hidden 
target (a “coin”) on a computer screen (see Figure 2.1-A and (Tassinari et 
al., 2006, Berniker et al., 2010)). Subjects were given noisy visual 
information about the target position in the form of a dot-cloud drawn from a 
Gaussian distribution centered at the true target position. To successfully 
estimate the position of the target, subjects could use both the likelihood, 
obtained from the displayed dots, and the prior, obtained from the 
distribution of previous target positions. Uncertainty in the likelihood varies 
with the dispersion of the displayed dots. This dispersion varied randomly 
from trial to trial, and thus could not be predicted beforehand. The average 
position of the target (the mean of the prior) was the middle of the screen, 
and subjects could estimate its uncertainty (prior uncertainty) from the 
distribution of target positions in previous trials (see 2.3 Materials and 
methods for details). Given that subjects had ample experience with the task 
from the behavioral experiment, they quickly acquired the prior. Successful 
estimates of the position were rewarded with points, which had motivational 
significance to the subjects (see 2.4.2 Additional results and Figure 2.8). 
The conditions comprised a two-by-two factorial design (Figure 2.1-B), with 
two levels of prior uncertainty (wide, more uncertain prior: P, and narrow, 
less uncertain prior: p) and two levels of likelihood uncertainty (wide 
likelihood: L, and narrow likelihood: l). Varying the uncertainty in the prior 
and in the likelihood independently, together with fMRI imaging, allowed us 
to find where they are represented in the brain. 
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2.4.1 Main results 
 
Prior and likelihood uncertainty affect behavior 
We first wanted to know if variations of prior and likelihood uncertainty in our 
task influence the estimation behavior. If subjects ignore the prior 
information and rely only on the current sensory feedback (i.e. likelihood 
information) then the weight of sensory feedback (slopes of Figure 2.2-A) in 
the estimation should be one. On the other hand, if subjects rely only on 
their prior knowledge and ignore likelihood information, then the weight of 
the sensory feedback should be zero. Use of this metric demonstrated that 
scanned subjects relied on both prior and likelihood information (0<slope<1; 
Figure 2.2-B). Data obtained from all subjects (both those who were 
scanned and those who were not) showed the same effects (Figure 2.9-A). 
Furthermore, subjects relied more on the likelihood information as the prior 
uncertainty increased and as the likelihood uncertainty decreased (main 
effect of prior, F1,43=207, p<10
-6; main effect of likelihood, F1,43=35, p<10
-6, 
ANOVA repeated measures (r.m.)). Qualitatively, such behavior would be 
expected if they used a Bayesian strategy (Vilares and Kording, 2011). 
Thus, in our experiment, subjects utilized knowledge of both prior and 
likelihood uncertainty for perceptual decision-making. 
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Figure 2.2. Behavioral results. (A) Estimates of the target position for one 
representative subject are shown as a function of the centroid of the displayed dots 
(likelihood). Displayed next to the graphs is the slope value of the linear regressions 
(solid line). The dashed line represents what the linear regression would look like if 
the subject only used likelihood information (slope=1). The horizontal dotted line 
represents a potential situation in which only prior information is taken into account 
(slope=0, localized at 0.5 which is the middle of the screen and the mean of the 
prior). (B) Average slope of the linear regression for the behavior of the 15 subjects 
during the scanning session, separated by condition. The slope quantifies the 
degree to which subjects rely on the current visual stimulus (likelihood) vs. the prior. 
The small blue rectangles represent the optimal Bayesian values (see 2.3 Materials 
and methods for details). (C) Average proportion of trials in which the subject 
accurately guessed the position of the target, separated by condition. Error bars in 
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(B) and (C) represent 95% confidence intervals for the mean (s.e.m.). Inset shows 
that there is a significant effect of both prior and likelihood uncertainty. n.s.= non-
significant, p>0.05; *** significant, p<0.001. See also Figure 2.9. 
 
Both kinds of uncertainty may be expected to change the precision 
of subjects’ estimates and thus their expected task performance. Not 
surprisingly, performance was better when each of the uncertainties was 
lower (Figure 2.2-C, main effect of prior, F1,43=161, p<10
-6; main effect of 
likelihood, F1,43=84, p<10
-6, ANOVA r.m.). Importantly, despite the fact that 
the slopes, and thus the relative weighting of the uncertain sources of 
information, differed significantly between the pL and Pl conditions (Figure 
2.2-B, p<1x10-4, W=0, Wilcoxon signed rank test), estimation performance 
between these two conditions was matched (Figure 2.2-C and Figure 2.9-C, 
p>0.05, W=31, Wilcoxon signed rank test). Even testing estimation 
performance on each individual subject did not reveal any significant 
difference between these two conditions (p>0.05 for each subject, corrected 
for multiple comparisons, comparing two proportions test). Therefore, as 
noted below, a comparison of these two conditions should provide a robust 
way to infer imaging-based differences between prior and likelihood 
uncertainty, while minimizing potential confounds due to differences in 
general uncertainty, performance, or reward expectation. 
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Prior and likelihood uncertainty have distinct neural representations 
The uncertainty associated with the prior affects behavior (Figure 2.2-B). We 
thus wanted to ask if and where it affects BOLD activities (see 2.4.2 
Additional results for details). We found that areas more active with 
increased uncertainty in the prior include putamen, amygdala, insula, and 
OFC (p<0.05 whole-brain corrected; family-wise-error (FWE) level; Figure 
2.3-A). Cross-validated condition-specific activation profiles (Figure 2.3-B) 
demonstrate that the activation in each of these regions is specifically 
related with prior uncertainty, and not likelihood uncertainty. Please note 
that, because in our design there is no “zero prior uncertainty” condition no 
real baseline exists, and thus what is relevant in the activation profiles is the 
relative difference between conditions. There was a significant main effect of 
prior uncertainty (all regions depicted are significant at p<0.01, F>9; except 
left amygdala, with a p=0.059, F1,43=3.76; ANOVA r.m.), with no significant 
main effects of likelihood (F1,43<0.73, p>0.05; ANOVA r.m.). Even if we use 
a two-fold cross-validation, the same results still hold (see 2.4.2 Additional 
results for details). We did not find any imaging evidence of an interaction 
between priors and likelihoods (for additional tests and controls, see 2.4.2 
Additional results and Figure 2.11-A). Areas more active with low prior 
uncertainty (i.e. more active with increased precision/confidence) 
encompassed the caudate nucleus, prefrontal cortex and areas adjacent to 
the anterior cingulate cortex (see Figure 2.4). Together, these results 
suggest that wide regions of the brain, primarily outside of the traditional 
sensory-motor pathway, encode prior uncertainty. 
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Figure 2.3. Brain regions more active during wide (more uncertain) prior 
conditions. (A) Stronger activations associated with high (vs. low) prior uncertainty 
were seen bilaterally in the putamen, amygdala, insula (top; y=0), and OFC (bottom; 
y=26). Functional activations are overlaid on coronal sections of the average of 
each subject’s T1-weighted structural brain scan (display threshold at p<0.0001 
unc., minimum 10 voxels; n=15). Activity in the right insula and left OFC appears at 
a less stringent p-value (p<0.001; not shown). In this and all subsequent figures, the 
right side of the brain corresponds to the right side of the image. (B) Percent signal 
change (PSC) by condition in the areas represented in (A). Data were extracted 
from the peak (most significant) voxel in each cluster using a leave-one-subject-out 
cross-validation procedure (see 2.3 Materials and methods for details). Plots 
represent the subject-averaged parameter estimates converted to PSC for the four 
conditions (n=15). Error bars represent standard error of the mean (s.e.m.).  
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Figure 2.4 - Brain regions more active during narrow (less uncertain) prior 
conditions.  Stronger activations associated with low (vs. high) prior uncertainty 
were seen near the anterior cingulate cortex, the prefrontal cortex (left panel; y=29) 
and the caudate (right panel; y=14). Functional activations are overlaid on coronal 
sections of the average of each subject’s T1-weighted structural brain scan (display 
threshold at p<0.0001 unc., minimum 10 voxels; n=15). The right side of the brain 
corresponds to the right side of the image.   
 
Given that activity related to prior uncertainty encompassed a wide 
set of regions, we wanted to know if the uncertainty associated with the 
currently presented stimulus (the likelihood uncertainty) leads to activity in 
the same areas. We should expect that a neural representation exists, given 
that likelihood uncertainty also affected behavior (Figure 2.2-B). Areas more 
active with high vs. low likelihood uncertainty were localized to bilateral 
regions of superior occipital visual cortex (p<0.05 FWE corrected; see 
Figure 2.5) and nowhere else in the brain at this threshold (see 2.4.2 
Additional results and Figure 2.11-B for controls). Taking advantage of the 
fact that the degree of likelihood uncertainty differed on every trial (where 
greater dot dispersion corresponded to higher visual variance and higher 
likelihood uncertainty) and that the between-trial variability in dot position 
produces some overlap between the low and high likelihood uncertainty 
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groups (see 2.4.2 Additional results and Figure 2.10), we also implemented 
a parametric fMRI model to test whether dot-dispersion variance modulated 
the same areas of occipital cortex on a trial-by-trial basis. This model 
revealed the same bilateral activations in the superior occipital visual cortex. 
These activations increased parametrically with the increase in likelihood 
uncertainty, had a higher level of significance and extended all the way to 
the calcarine sulcus and lingual gyrus (p<0.05 FWE corrected; Figure 2.5-
C). Likelihood uncertainty in our task thus seems to affect BOLD signal 
mainly in areas corresponding to the early stages of the visuomotor 
pathway. 
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Figure 2.5. Brain regions more active during higher likelihood uncertainty 
conditions. (A) Stronger activations associated with high (vs. low) likelihood 
uncertainty were seen bilaterally in the superior occipital cortex (z=22). Functional 
activations are overlaid on the axial section of the subject-averaged scan (n=15). 
(B) Condition-specific percent signal change in the left occipital area shows a main 
effect of likelihood uncertainty significant at p<0.0001, with no significant main effect 
of prior (p>0.05). Data were extracted using a leave-one-subject-out cross-
validation procedure. The same results hold if using a two-fold cross-validation 
procedure. The data plot represents the average parameter estimates (±s.e.m., 
cross-validated) converted to percentage signal change for the four conditions. (C) 
Brain regions parametrically correlated with higher likelihood uncertainty. Stronger 
activations associated with a parametric increase in likelihood uncertainty (standard 
deviation of the displayed dots at each trial) were seen bilaterally in the superior 
occipital cortex, extending down all the way to the calcarine sulcus and lingual gyrus 
(y=-88; z=22). Functional activations are overlaid on the axial (up) and coronal 
(down) sections of the subject-averaged scan (for all functional activations shown, 
display threshold is at p<0.0001 unc., minimum 10 voxels; n=15). 
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Correlations across subjects between prior-related behavior and 
activations 
Thus far, we have analyzed how the two factors, prior and likelihood 
uncertainty, affect activities in the brain, and identified a small number of key 
regions. For those analyses we did not use observed behavior but rather the 
experimentally and mathematically defined uncertainties. However, if any of 
these brain regions are involved in the decision-making process then we 
should expect them to be correlated with behavioral variance across 
subjects (see also 2.3 Materials and methods and 2.4.2 Additional results).  
We hypothesized that subjects who were able to better detect the 
changes in prior uncertainty (i.e. those who changed more their behavior 
when the prior uncertainty changed) could also show higher differences in 
brain activity between the two prior conditions. This is indeed what was 
observed for both the right and left putamen (Figure 2.6-A:B, r=0.65 and 
r=0.61, p<0.02, Spearman correlation) and the OFC (Figure 2.6-C, r=0.66, 
p<0.01, Spearman correlation). The other reported areas (namely, 
amygdala and insula) did not show a significant correlation. These results 
suggest that, besides tracking prior uncertainty, putamen and OFC might be 
directly related with behavioral change. 
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Figure 2.6. Relationship between prior uncertainty-related brain activity and 
behavioral measures. (A-C) Prior uncertainty differences in activation for individual 
participants at the right putamen (A; peak at 30, -2, -2), left putamen (B; peak at -
22,0,4) and OFC (C; peak at 22,26,-12) are regressed against individuals’ sensitivity 
to prior change. Presented on the graphics are the respective Spearman 
correlations. (D) Prior uncertainty differences in activation for individual participants 
at the right putamen (peak at 30, -2, -2) are regressed against the average weight 
given to likelihood vs prior information (the slope). Presented on the graphic is the 
respective Spearman correlation. 
 
We also wanted to look for a behavioral measure that could 
represent a specific “personality trait”. The average slope of a subject 
(averaged over the four conditions) can provide such a measure, as a 
higher value indicates that subjects on average tend to rely more on current 
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sensory information and less on prior knowledge, and vice versa. Indeed, as 
we have seen above, subjects varied behaviorally in how much, on average, 
they relied on prior information (see Figure 2.2), and also varied in their 
mean fMRI activation response to uncertainty in prior-related brain areas 
(see Figure 2.3). We found that this average slope was positively correlated 
with the degree of differential brain activation in the right putamen (Figure 
2.6-D, r=0.66, p<0.01, Spearman correlation). Note that the effect in the 
putamen (in terms of difference between conditions) is actually the highest 
compared to the other brain areas (see Sup. Table S1). This finding raises 
the possibility that a general higher involvement of the putamen in the task, 
potentially by signaling greater prior uncertainty, may enhance learning from 
new sensory information, and therefore subjects in whom the putamen is 
more engaged tend to rely more on new than in prior information. 
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Online representation of Bayesian slopes 
We wanted to ask how the brain computes prior versus likelihood 
information online in order to arrive at a sensorimotor decision. For that 
decision, at each trial the subject needs to decide how much to weigh the 
likelihood relative to the prior. If subjects behave as predicted by Bayesian 
statistics, then this slope can be estimated for each trial (see 2.3 Materials 
and methods for details). Testing for a correlation between this 
“instantaneous Bayesian slope” and BOLD activation, we found significant 
decision related activations in the prefrontal cortex (PFC), roughly in 
Brodmann area 9 (p<0.0001 unc., see Figure 2.7). This finding suggests a 
possible role of prefrontal cortex in combining prior and likelihood 
information to estimate the target’s position. 
 
Figure 2.7 - Brain regions parametrically correlated with the instantaneous 
Bayesian slope. Stronger activations associated with a parametric increase in the 
instantaneous Bayesian slope (a measure that indicates how much the subject 
weights prior and likelihood information, at each trial) were seen in the right superior 
medial prefrontal cortex (y=48; z=32). Functional activations are overlaid on the 
coronal section (left) and axial (right) sections of the subject-averaged scan (display 
threshold at p<0.0001 uncorrected, minimum 10 voxels).  
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2.4.2 Additional results 
 
Comparison between prior and likelihood uncertainty activations 
In many experimental and theoretical conceptualizations of uncertainty, prior 
and likelihood are not distinguished. However, as shown in this paper, a 
comparison of prior and likelihood uncertainty yielded quite different profiles: 
while prior uncertainty is largely associated with widespread activations in 
limbic and paralimbic brain areas and the putamen, likelihood uncertainty is 
associated with much more localized brain areas in the early stages of the 
dorsal sensory-motor pathway (see Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.5). Moreover, 
the effects of prior and likelihood are selectively different across these 
regions: The visual/superior occipital areas show an effect of likelihood 
uncertainty significantly higher than the effect observed in the putamen, 
amygdala, insula and OFC, which, by their turn, show an effect of prior 
uncertainty that is significantly higher than the effect observed in the 
superior occipital areas (T>2, p<0.05, paired t-test).  That no overlap was 
observed between areas activated by prior and likelihood uncertainty and 
that direct comparison of the effects shows significant differences in activity 
patterns between the areas suggests that these forms of uncertainty are 
differentially represented in the nervous system 
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Brain regions activated in successful trials 
To understand if scoring a point was rewarding to the subjects, we 
compared successful trials (in which subjects accurately guessed the 
position of the coin, and received a point as reward) with unsuccessful trials. 
In other words, if subjects derive a sense of reward for earning a point, then 
successful trials should activate reward associated areas. We find that 
successful trials were associated with strong bilateral activations in areas 
typically related with reward, including dorsal and ventral striatum and 
amygdala (Figure 2.8). There were essentially no areas that were 
significantly more active with unsuccessful vs. successful trials (at a 
threshold of p<0.001 unc.). The fact that we do not see significant 
activations upon unsuccessful trials further reinforces the idea that the 
activations we found related to prior or likelihood uncertainty cannot be 
explained by lower reward expectations. The fact that we see reward-related 
areas active upon success adds evidence that receiving a point is 
rewarding.  
 
Figure 2.8- Brain regions more activated in successful vs. unsuccessful trials. 
Stronger activations were seen bilaterally in the striatum (y=8). Functional 
activations are overlaid on the coronal section of the subject-averaged anatomical 
scan (display threshold at p<0.0001 uncorrected, minimum 10 voxels). 
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Behavioral data during the first (lab) session 
Variations of prior and likelihood uncertainty in our task significantly 
influenced the estimation behavior also if we looked at the behavior from all 
27 subjects during the first behavioral session (performed outside the 
scanner). Subjects relied more on the likelihood information as the prior 
uncertainty increased and as the likelihood uncertainty decreased (main 
effect of prior, F1,79= 173.74, p<10
-6; main effect of likelihood, F1,79=45.43, 
p<10-6, ANOVA repeated measures; see Figure 2.9-A). This shows that 
subjects could detect and react accordingly to variations in both prior and 
likelihood uncertainty. Furthermore, they did so in a way qualitatively 
predicted by Bayesian statistics. 
Bayesian statistics does not tell us only that prior and likelihood 
information should be combined according to their uncertainties, it can also 
give us the optimal values given the associated uncertainties (see 2.3 
Materials and methods). The values obtained were qualitatively similar to 
what would be expected if people were using a Bayesian strategy (see 
Figure 2.9-A). Quantitatively, they are identical to the Bayesian optimal ones 
for the pl and PL conditions. The values for the pL and Pl conditions go in 
the “correct trend”, but are statistically different from the optimal values 
(T>2, p<0.05, t-test). This might be due either to an overestimation of the 
narrow prior uncertainty and underestimation of the narrow likelihood 
uncertainty, or to an underestimation of both wide prior and likelihood 
uncertainty.  The reasons for the difference with the optimal Bayesian 
values might indicate that subjects are using some heuristics that looks like 
Bayesian but is not fully so, and/or that we couldn’t capture the “real” priors 
and likelihood uncertainties sensed by the subjects, which can be different 
from the experimentally imposed ones (due to sampling noise, noise in the 
visual system, etc.). 
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From the linear regression we can also obtain the mean of the prior 
that the subjects were using (see 2.3 Materials and methods for details). We 
can see that, for all conditions, the mean that subjects used was identical to 
the real mean of the prior (P=0.5; see Figure 2.9-B), showing that subjects 
readily learned and used the information given about the prior’s mean. 
 
 
Figure 2.9 - Behavioral results in the first session. (A) Average slope of the 
linear regression for the behavior of the 27 subjects during the first behavioral 
session, separated by condition. The slope quantifies the degree to which subjects 
rely on the current visual stimulus (likelihood) vs. the prior. The small blue 
rectangles represent the optimal Bayesian values (see 2.3 Materials and methods 
for details).  (B) Average value for subjects’ mean of the prior (see 2.3 Materials and 
methods for details). The blue line represents the experimentally imposed mean of 
the prior (P=0.5). (C) Average proportion of trials in which the subjects accurately 
guessed the position of the target, separated by condition. Error bars in (A). (B) and 
(C) represent the 95% confidence interval for the mean. Inset in (A) and (C) shows 
that there is a significant effect of both prior and likelihood uncertainty. ns= non-
significant, p>0.05; *** significant, p<0.001. 
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Overlap between wide and narrow likelihood groups 
For the likelihood, two main conditions existed: a wide (more uncertain) 
likelihood, in which the dots were more spread apart ( L = 0.15), and a more 
narrow likelihood ( l = 0.06). Looking at the experimental standard 
deviations (std) we can see that the average for the two likelihood groups is 
indeed significantly different, and near the imposed std (T=18.3, p<10-6, t-
test, see Figure 2.10-A). Nevertheless, the between-trial variability in dot 
position creates overlap between the high and low uncertainty groups (see 
Figure 2.10-B). More specifically, we found that with the actual noise 
samples produced in our study 23% of the high uncertainty trials were not 
significantly different from 95% of the low uncertainty trials and, equivalently, 
84% of the low uncertainty trials had dot dispersions that were 
indistinguishable from 95% of the high uncertainty trials. Hence, for more 
than half of the trials (54% on average), the std generated in one condition 
was within a 95% confidence interval for the stds generated by the other 
likelihood condition. Therefore, a parametric model that incorporates the 
specific sensory uncertainty per trial promises to give a more sensitive 
method to identify regions that track likelihood uncertainty (see Figure 2.5). 
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Figure 2.10 - Overlap between wide and narrow likelihood groups. (A) Average 
value for the standard deviations (std) of the blue likelihood dots during the narrow 
likelihood (l) and wide likelihood (L) conditions, for the 15 subjects during the fMRI 
experiment. Error bars represent the 95% confidence interval for the mean. *** 
significant, p<0.001. (B) Graphic representing the std value at each trial, for all the 
15 subjects during the fMRI experiment. Black dots represent the std value of a 
particular narrow likelihood trial (l), and grey dots represent wide likelihood trials (L). 
Right to the graphic is a histogram of the corresponding data (black for l, grey for L). 
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Controls 
 
Activity related to prior uncertainty is independent from reward 
expectation 
Interestingly, uncertainty in prior information evokes fMRI activity in many of 
the same brain areas traditionally associated with reward processing 
(Cromwell and Schultz, 2003, Gottfried et al., 2003). This raises the 
possibility that we might have observed responses in these regions because 
prior uncertainty changes the expected or received reward. However, our 
two-by-two experimental design allowed us to compare two conditions (wide 
prior/narrow likelihood [Pl] vs. narrow prior/wide likelihood [pL]) that were 
matched in performance and expected reward (Figure 2.2-C), yet differed in 
the origin of the most relevant information (Figure 2.2-B). Contrasting these 
two conditions (Pl>pL) we observed BOLD activity increases across the 
same network of brain areas that appear in the high vs. low prior uncertainty 
contrast, including putamen, amygdala, insula and OFC (p<0.001 
uncorrected (unc.)), implying that the increased activations arising as a 
consequence of prior uncertainty cannot be attributed merely to a lower 
reward expectation. 
 Furthermore, we performed an additional control analysis by 
incorporating each subject’s performance in the fMRI model as a nuisance 
covariate, in this way modeling out performance/reward effects. This 
analysis again revealed significant activations in the same brain areas 
(p<0.05 FWE corrected), reinforcing the idea that the differential activations 
observed in putamen, amygdala, insula, and OFC were not related to 
different reward expectations. 
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Activity is not related to posterior uncertainty or reaction times 
Given that prior and likelihood uncertainty together give rise to general 
(posterior) uncertainty, it is possible that some of the observed activations 
relate to posterior uncertainty. We can identify such effects using the 
diagonal comparisons, as behavioral performance should indicate the level 
of posterior uncertainty. For example, if the prior-related areas (Figure 2.3) 
specifically reflect prior uncertainty and not posterior uncertainty, then they 
should be present in the diagonal contrast Pl vs pL (different prior 
uncertainties but similar posterior uncertainties), but not in the contrast PL 
vs Pl or in the contrast pL vs pl (similar prior uncertainties but different 
posterior uncertainties). Direct comparisons of the beta values reveals that 
putamen, amygdala, insula, and OFC are significantly more active in the Pl 
vs pL contrast than in the PL vs Pl contrast or in the pL vs pl contrast 
(p<0.05, T>1.76, paired t-test), suggesting that the representations identified 
here with prior uncertainty are not associated with posterior uncertainty. 
Similarly, we can ask if the results apparently related with likelihood 
uncertainty might be instead related with posterior uncertainty. Following the 
same logic as with prior uncertainty, we see that the superior occipital visual 
areas seen in the high likelihood uncertainty contrast are also significantly 
active in the diagonal comparison pL vs Pl (different likelihood uncertainties 
but similar posterior uncertainties), but not in the PL vs pL or Pl vs pl 
contrasts (different posterior uncertainties but similar likelihood 
uncertainties). Direct comparisons of the beta values reveals that the same 
superior occipital areas are significantly more active in the pL vs Pl contrast 
than in the PL vs pL or the Pl vs pl contrasts (p<0.05, T>1.76, paired t-test). 
Therefore, the increased activations observed in these superior occipital 
areas seem to relate specifically to likelihood uncertainty. 
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Control task 
Although our task design allowed us to control for confounding effects of 
reward expectation and posterior uncertainty, there are several other 
variables that could have potentially altered interpretation of our results. For 
example, visual characteristics can differ across the four conditions in terms 
of the eccentricity of the observed dots, i.e. because the dots are more 
spread apart this might induce a broader, more dispersed area of foveal 
stimulation. Of course the fact that the dots are more spread apart indicates 
in itself that the visual stimulus is more uncertain, but we wanted to know if 
the same visual areas would appear even if the stimulus of interest has no 
uncertainty. Moreover, the four conditions differ with regard to the distance 
that subjects need to move the “net” on the screen. Together these issues 
raise the possibility that the observed fMRI activations could be driven by 
visual and motor features, independently of uncertainty. Therefore, in a 
control fMRI study that took place following the main experiment, subjects 
participated in an identical task, but in this case the target was revealed at 
the onset of the trial. In this way, the sensory input observed (visual dot 
dispersion) and the required motor output (movement to the predicted 
position) were matched to the main experiment, the only difference being 
that there was no uncertainty involved because the target was always 
visible.  
With respect to the prior (high vs. low, same contrast as for Figure 
2.3), we found a very different pattern from the one observed in the main 
experiment. The only significant areas (p<0.05, FWE at cluster level) 
consisted of activations of the left post-central gyrus and supplementary 
motor area (see Figure 2.11-A). Activations in these areas may be related to 
the increased average distance that the cursor was moved, and the fact that 
all subjects used their right hand to make the motor response. Critically, no 
significant activity was identified at the key regions identified from the main 
experiment, including putamen, amygdala, insula, and OFC, even at a 
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lenient statistical threshold (threshold at p=0.01 unc.). The interaction 
between prior uncertainty level (wide vs. narrow) and experiment (main 
study vs. control study) revealed these areas to be significantly more active 
in the main experiment than in the control (p<0.01 unc.). Together, these 
results indicate that the principal fMRI activations identified as a function of 
increased prior uncertainty (see Figure 2.3) were unlikely to be due to task-
related sensory or motor confounds. 
With respect to the standard analysis of the likelihood (high vs. low; 
same contrast as for Figure 2.5-A:B), fMRI activations were also observed in 
the occipital cortex, but centered medially around the calcarine sulcus, likely 
corresponding to visual cortical area V1 (Figure 2.11-B). These responses 
are approximately 15 mm away from the more dorsal superior occipital 
areas identified in the main contrast of likelihood uncertainty, suggesting 
once again that mere visual perceptual aspects of the task did not influence 
the main findings. Also, comparing directly the effects of likelihood 
uncertainty (wide vs. narrow) in the main experiment vs. the control we 
observe that the superior occipital areas are significantly more active in the 
main experiment than in the control (p<0.05 unc.). For the parametric 
analysis we also found largely non-overlapping areas (except for an area 
around the calcarine sulcus), and a direct comparison between trials in the 
main experiment and the control experiment demonstrated that these 
superior occipital areas are significantly more active during the main 
experiment (p<0.05, unc.). It thus seems that the dot dispersion per se does 
create a differential response in V1 (maybe due to different foveal 
stimulations), but that the stronger activations in the superior occipital cortex 
occur if the uncertain stimulus (with higher dot dispersion) is the stimulus of 
interest. Taken together, these controls suggest that the activations 
obtained with increased likelihood uncertainty are not merely due to different 
foveal representations. 
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Figure 2.11 - Brain regions activated during the control task. (A) Stronger 
activations associated with the control block-equivalent high (vs. low) prior 
uncertainty were seen in the left supplementary motor area (y= -2) and post-central 
gyrus (y=-17).  In this and all subsequent figures, the right side of the brain 
corresponds to the right side of the image. (B) Stronger activations associated with 
the control block-equivalent high (vs. low) likelihood uncertainty were seen in an 
area around the calcarine sulcus, roughly corresponding to V1 (y = -84). Functional 
activations are overlaid on the coronal section of the average subjects’ T1-weighted 
scan (display threshold at p<0.0001 uncorrected, minimum 10 voxels). 
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2.5 Discussion 
In this study we tested where prior and likelihood uncertainty are 
represented in the brain. We were particularly interested in knowing: 1) Are 
prior and likelihood uncertainty represented in the same set of areas? 2) Is 
uncertainty for visuomotor tasks represented in the traditional visuomotor 
pathway or in specialized areas? By combining a psychophysical paradigm 
with fMRI analysis in which two of the conditions were matched for 
performance and posterior uncertainty, we could disentangle the specific 
effects of prior and likelihood uncertainty. We found that greater prior 
uncertainty evoked increased brain activity in specialized brain areas that 
include the putamen, amygdala, OFC and parts of the insula. In contrast, 
greater likelihood uncertainty primarily affected neural activities in the 
occipital cortex, in areas that belong to the traditional visuomotor pathway. 
Prior and likelihood uncertainty were thus represented in largely non-
overlapping areas, highlighting the importance of distinguishing between 
these kinds of uncertainty. 
There are numerous reasons why the brain could use a strategy 
where prior uncertainty is processed in these specialized brain areas. 
Computationally, the forming of a prior results from integration over time, 
requiring long-term memory, and may be more difficult to implement in 
domain-specific sensory/motor brain areas. Anatomically, OFC, amygdala, 
putamen and insula receive inputs from sensory areas, which are needed to 
build a prior, and project to motor effector systems in the brainstem and 
cortex(Albin et al., 1989, Whalen, 1998, Rolls, 2000, Singer et al., 2009) 
which are needed to use the prior. These connections may allow the 
optimization of behavior in the context of varying prior uncertainty and, if the 
prior is too uncertain, facilitate behavior change to gather relevant new 
information(Whalen, 1998). Additionally, these areas are connected or even 
directly involved with reward processing (Rolls, 2000, Preuschoff et al., 
2006, Rangel et al., 2008), and could thus more easily combine the need for 
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more information with its potential value. Moreover, previous research has 
highlighted their involvement in uncertainty in reward(Critchley et al., 2001, 
Huettel et al., 2005, Tobler et al., 2007, Kepecs et al., 2008, Singer et al., 
2009) and, more specifically, in signaling ambiguity and the need to learn 
more about the world(Hsu et al., 2005). Thus, computational demands, 
anatomical connections, and previous research support the involvement of 
these areas in signaling prior uncertainty. 
Likelihood uncertainty, in contrast, was associated with activations in 
areas that are part of the traditional visuomotor pathway. Our task is visual, 
and thus information about the task is also transmitted through the same 
route. Hence, these results concur with the hypothesis presented by 
theoretical models, such as probabilistic population codes and sampling 
theories(Ma et al., 2006, Fiser et al., 2010), that likelihood uncertainty is part 
of the inherent code by which neurons transmit information. According to 
these models, the activity of the same neurons transmits information (e.g. 
the position) along with uncertainty about this information. From a 
computational perspective, sensory information needs to be continuously 
used to calculate estimates of likelihood uncertainty(Burge et al., 2008) and 
hence sensory areas seem best suited for this ongoing update. Indeed, 
previous studies in human visual perception have also found that 
uncertainty affects brain activity in the corresponding sensory 
areas(Beauchamp et al., 2010, Helbig et al., 2012), and, moreover, they 
found that activity in visual areas was higher when the visual stimulus was 
more uncertain(McKeefry et al., 1997, Murray et al., 2002, Beauchamp et 
al., 2010). This occurred for random/ nonrandom dot motion(McKeefry et al., 
1997), incoherent/coherent shapes(Murray et al., 2002) and blurry/non-
blurry images(Helbig et al., 2012), indicating that the effects observed are 
not exclusive to the particular stimulus we used. Together, our results 
suggest that likelihood uncertainty about a visual stimulus may be 
processed along with the stimulus itself in the visual cortex. 
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 For Bayesian decision-making, the brain needs not only to compute 
prior and likelihood uncertainty, but also to use them for appropriate 
weighting of both pieces of information. Activity in the brain areas where this 
occurs should then relate to these weights, which depend nonlinearly on 
both uncertainties. We found that an area in the PFC tracks the trial-by-trial 
weight on current vs. prior information. This area would then be a candidate 
area to receive information from both prior and likelihood uncertainty and 
calculate accordingly how much weight should be placed on new 
information. Indeed, the PFC is known for its role in planning and cognitive 
control(Miller, 2000) and, interestingly, has even been specifically 
associated with Bayesian decision-making(Hampton et al., 2006). Our 
results thus suggest how a network of brain areas may give rise to Bayesian 
instantiations of perception and behavior. 
Although our study focused on the integration of priors with visual 
information, uncertainty may be represented differently for other sensory 
modalities or tasks. Our task dealt with a new, rapidly acquired prior over a 
series of trials, in which subjects, during each trial, had unlimited time to 
make a decision. Hence, it can be considered a cognitive task. Studies 
using different kinds of tasks, but that were also cognitive, have previously 
associated the prior-uncertainty areas identified here with decision-making 
and reward uncertainty(Critchley et al., 2001, Huettel et al., 2005, 
Preuschoff et al., 2006, Brand et al., 2007), making it more likely that our 
results would hold for other types of cognitive tasks as well. However, it is 
possible that other types of priors, such as the ones involved in early 
sensory perception (e.g. “light from above”), which might have been learned 
over many years (or even generations), have distinct 
representations(Fischer and Pena, 2011). As for likelihood uncertainty, if 
indeed it is transmitted concurrently with the sensory information itself, then 
a non-visual task should activate non-visual brain areas. Interesting future 
studies could help to answer these questions, for example by applying a 
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computationally equivalent task in which the sensory feedback information 
given is not visual but, say, olfactory or auditory; or by implementing a 
faster/more unconscious sensory perception task.  
The association of specific brain areas with prior uncertainty and 
potentially with subjects’ individual tendency to rely on new sensory 
information (as is the case for putamen) may have implications for the 
understanding of learning disabilities and abnormal decision-making 
behavior. Learning, in a Bayesian sense, can be interpreted as the weight 
given to new evidence over prior beliefs(Courville et al., 2006). If the prior is 
more certain then less learning from new information should occur, and vice 
versa(Courville et al., 2006). Changes in the brain areas that represent prior 
uncertainty might then lead for example to an underestimation of prior 
uncertainty, potentially affecting learning from new information. Interestingly, 
it has been found that patients with damage to the amygdala(Brand et al., 
2007), OFC(Hsu et al., 2005), insula(Clark et al., 2008) and 
putamen(Shohamy et al., 2004) show considerable deficits in making 
decisions that involve uncertainty and learning from feedback, and that the 
existence of intact connections between these structures is essential for 
learning from new sensory information(Baxter et al., 2000, Cohen et al., 
2008). If indeed one of the reasons why these deficits occur is based on an 
underestimation of prior uncertainty, then these could potentially be 
reversed by providing more certain current sensory information or by giving 
explicit information about prior uncertainty. 
The finding of the areas involved in prior and likelihood uncertainty 
representation provides insight for an ongoing debate in the computational 
literature: is uncertainty part of the general code by which neurons 
exchange information and thus encoded in every neuron’s output(Ma et al., 
2006, Fiser et al., 2010), or are there specialized areas that deal with the 
encoding of uncertainty(Hsu et al., 2005, Preuschoff et al., 2006, Schultz et 
al., 2008, Singer et al., 2009)? Our findings suggest that both of these 
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hypotheses might be correct, but for different kinds of uncertainty: likelihood 
uncertainty seems intrinsically embodied in the stimulus encoding itself, as it 
is represented in sensorimotor areas, while prior uncertainty is encoded in 
specialized areas. Future models of brain function should take into account 
uncertainty in the prior and in the likelihood separately, since both their 
neural representations and their behavioral effects are distinct. 
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3.1 Summary 
Dopamine and putamen activity are crucial for decision-making under 
uncertainty. However, their specific role is still a subject of intense debate.  
To test potential roles, we had Parkinson’s disease (PD) patients do a visual 
decision-making task in which both prior and current sensory uncertainty 
(likelihood) were varied and where behavior is often predicted by Bayesian 
statistics. We found that many aspects of uncertainty processing were 
conserved in PD: both groups could learn prior distributions and utilize priors 
and current sensory information. However, in the PD group, in particular 
when off drugs, subjects showed a much weaker sensitivity to differences in 
likelihood uncertainty. Our results suggest that dopamine and putamen 
activity, which are affected by PD, have a crucial role in the processing of 
current sensory uncertainty. 
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“Se podes olhar, vê. Se podes ver, repara”. 
 “If you can look, see. If you can see, notice”. 
      José Saramago 
 
3.2 Introduction 
Every day we are faced with decisions that have associated uncertainty. 
They may range from very important, life-changing situations (should I marry 
this person? Which career should I choose?), to minor decisions that we 
make, sometimes without even noticing that we are doing them (where is 
my wallet? What is that object in the sky?). When making a decision, we 
combine information from the past, called prior (e.g. how trustworthy has 
this person shown to be? What types of objects generally appear in the 
sky?), with current sensory information, or likelihood (what am I feeling at 
this time? What is the shape of the object that I am seeing now?). Correctly 
combining these pieces of information is the key to effective decision-
making. 
Bayesian theory tells us that the best way to combine these pieces of 
information is to join them according to their respective uncertainties. 
Hence, understanding how the brain performs these calculations seems of 
extreme importance if we want to understand what goes wrong when there 
is faulty decision-making. Previous research in the lab has indicated that the 
putamen was particularly important in this process, with activity from the 
putamen correlating with both increased prior uncertainty but also with 
individual’s tendencies to sense and attend to current vs. prior information 
(Vilares et al., 2012). However, from the fMRI data alone it is not possible to 
know in which of these processes putamen activity has a causal role. Better 
understanding the role of putamen may shed light on how the brain 
performs the computations necessary for correct decision-making under 
uncertainty. 
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Existing literature shows that activity from the putamen either directly or 
indirectly affects decision-making under uncertainty. For example, putamen 
activity has been associated with ambiguity, i.e. with lack of knowledge of 
the real probabilities of a given event (Hsu et al., 2005). It has also been 
implicated in learning (Grafton et al., 1995, Lehericy et al., 2005, Poldrack et 
al., 2005, Doyon et al., 2009, Orban et al., 2010). Interestingly, when 
learning a motor sequence putamen activity decreases after training, but 
remains high if the sequence is random (Lehericy et al., 2005, Poldrack et 
al., 2005). These studies can be interpreted as putamen activity signaling for 
prior uncertainty, which decreases with learning but keeps being high if the 
sequence is random or the probabilities of events are unknown. Another 
interpretation is that it allows focusing on the current incoming information, 
which would equally predict the observed data. As activity from the putamen 
is severely compromised in people that suffer from Parkinson’s disease 
(Kish et al., 1988, Playford et al., 1992) we can use Parkinson’s disease 
(PD) patients to ask fundamental questions about the role of the putamen in 
decision-making under uncertainty.  
PD leads to a depletion of dopamine (Kish et al., 1988) which probably 
mediates the putamen’s influence on decision-making under uncertainty. 
Indeed, dopamine has been associated with uncertainty (Fiorillo et al., 2003, 
Friston, 2009, Friston et al., 2012). However, its precise role is still unclear 
and subject to intense debate (Berridge and Robinson, 1998, Wise, 2004, 
Friston et al., 2012). It has been proposed that dopamine is involved in 
attention and saliency of a stimulus (Berridge and Robinson, 1998, Kapur, 
2003, McClure et al., 2003), even when that stimulus does not predict 
reward (Horvitz, 2000). It has also been proposed that dopamine regulates 
the weight given to bottom-up current sensory information (likelihood) vs. 
top-down prior beliefs (Friston, 2009, Beeler et al., 2010, Friston et al., 2012, 
Galea et al., 2012), and that it codes for the uncertainty in the current 
stimulus (Friston, 2009, Friston et al., 2012, Galea et al., 2012). 
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Furthermore, dopamine has been implicated in learning (Dayan and 
Balleine, 2002, McClure et al., 2003, Frank et al., 2004), and hence could be 
crucial for learning the uncertainty of a given event. To distinguish between 
these ideas we can compare PD patients with healthy subjects on a task 
that allows disambiguating different aspects of decision-making under 
uncertainty (Vilares et al., 2012). 
Previous studies have shown that PD patients have impairments in 
decision-making. They have trouble at reacting to unexpected events (Galea 
et al., 2012), task switching (Cools et al., 2003) and shifting mental sets 
according to external cues (Mimura et al., 2006). They are also impaired in 
making decisions under ambiguity (Delazer et al., 2009) and in using 
negative feedback (Brand et al., 2004). It seems reasonable to assume that 
some of these deficits may actually result from the wrong processing of 
uncertainty information, e.g. an overreliance on prior experience or a 
diminished capacity to attend external cues. Studying how PD patients learn 
and deal with uncertainty in prior and current sensory information may help 
in the understanding of which specific challenges PD patients have to face 
when making decisions under uncertainty. 
Here, we had Parkinson disease patients and age-matched controls perform 
a decision-making task in which they could use both prior and likelihood to 
estimate the position of a target. Patients performed the task once “on” 
medication (more dopamine in their system) and once “off” medication (less 
dopamine). Prior and likelihood uncertainty were varied independently in a 
two-by-two factorial design, and for each condition the Bayesian slope, i.e. 
the weight given to current vs. prior information, was obtained. In this way, 
we could independently analyze the capacity of learning the prior, the 
average weight given to likelihood vs. prior information, and the ability to 
attend and react to differences in likelihood uncertainty. Patients performed 
significantly worse in this task when compared to age-matched controls, and 
that performance could be ameliorated with dopamine administration. 
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Moreover, patients could learn the prior as well as controls and did not show 
significant differences on overall reliance on current vs. prior information. 
However, they were impaired at reacting to differences in likelihood 
uncertainty, and this impairment was particularly strong when they were off 
medication. Our results indicate that PD patients have deficits in reacting to 
differences in likelihood uncertainty, suggesting a causal role of 
dopaminergic transmission from the putamen in the processing of 
uncertainty. 
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3.3 Materials and methods 
 
 
Figure 3.1 - Experimental setup. (A) Illustration of the task. Subjects guess the 
position of a hidden target (the “coin”, represented by the yellow dot) using a net 
(vertical blue bar) which they can displace horizontally. At the onset of each trial, 
subjects receive noisy information about the position of the hidden target in the form 
of a set of 5 blue dots (the likelihood). Subjects then move the net to the guessed 
position and press the mouse button to confirm their choice, after which the true 
target position is displayed. A new trial then begins 1500 ms later. Left: illustration of 
the computer display that was presented to the subjects. Right: typical time course 
of a trial. (B) The 4 conditions of the experiment. The experiment consisted of a two-
by-two factorial design, with two types of prior (p=narrow prior; P=wide prior) and 
two types of likelihood (l=narrow likelihood; L=wide likelihood). The wider conditions 
are the ones with more associated uncertainty. 
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Subjects 
 23 Parkinson disease (PD) patients and 16 healthy controls were recruited 
for the study. From these, 8 patients were discarded: 6 due to failure to 
follow the “on-off” medication schedule required for the experiment, 1 
because she was still not taking meds and 1 because he couldn’t 
understand the task even after several explanations. One healthy control 
was discarded because she had already participated in a very similar study 
in the lab before.  Thus, in total, 15 PD patients (9 women) and 15 non-PD 
controls (8 women) participated in the experiment. Subjects were paid $20 
for participating in each session of the experiment, so they got $40 for both 
sessions. Written informed consent was obtained for all subjects. All 
protocols were approved by the Northwestern University IRB. 
PD patients: All the PD patients were recruited from the Rehabilitation 
Institute of Chicago and the Northwestern Memorial Hospital.  All PD 
patients had idiopathic Parkinson’s disease as diagnosed by a neurologist. 
The 15 patients included in the study had between 43 to 81 years old (62.8 
± 9.6 years old; mean ± std). Severity of disease was equivalent to Hoehn 
and Yahr stages ranging between I and III. The duration of Parkinson’s 
disease varied from 1.5 months to 18 years from the time of initial diagnosis 
(6.2 ± 4.8 years; mean ± std). Eleven of the fifteen patients included in the 
study were taking daily L-dopa preparations. Of those, eight received 
additional pharmacotherapy with dopamine receptor agonists, rasagiline or 
amantadine. Four patients were taking dopamine receptor agonists and/or 
rasagiline and/or amantadine. L-dopa equivalent units (LEU) of patients’ 
regular daily dopamine replacement therapies were calculated as described 
elsewhere (Tomlinson et al., 2010), and varied between 100 mg to 1733 mg 
(675 ± 436 mg; mean ± std). 
Healthy controls: Age-matched healthy volunteers, with no current known 
neurological problems, were recruited for the study, usually from amongst 
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the patients’ spouses or partners. The 15 healthy controls included in the 
study had between 43 to 84 years old (63.4 ± 11.6 years old; mean ± std). 
No significant difference in age existed between PD patients and Controls 
(p=0.88, t-test). 
 
General procedure 
 PD patients completed two test sessions, once about 1 hour after they had 
taken their regular dopaminergic medication (on-state) and once after 
overnight withdrawal from dopaminergic medication (off-state). Session 
order was counterbalanced across patients, so that in total 8 patients started 
in the on-state, and 7 started in the off-state. Control subjects also 
completed two test sessions, and the results reported for controls were the 
average of the results obtained in the two sessions. For both PD patients 
and controls, the two sessions were generally done in two consecutive days.  
 
Coin-catching task 
Subjects performed a decision-making task in which they had to guess the 
position of a hidden coin on a screen (Vilares et al., 2012). They were told 
the cover story of a coin being tossed into a pond and informed that their 
task was to guess where the coin had fallen. They could not see the coin, 
but they could see 5 blue dots that were the “splashes” produced by the coin 
falling in. They were told that the person who threw the coin aimed, albeit 
imperfectly, at the center of the screen (mean of prior). They were also told 
that, between blocks, the thrower changed, and the new one might be better 
or worse at throwing (what indirectly informed them that the variance of the 
prior changed). To estimate the coin position, subjects could use (although 
they were never explicitly told so) both the coin position’s likelihood, 
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obtained from the “splashes”, and its prior (the distribution of previous coin 
locations). There was no temporal deadline. These instructions were 
scripted and given to the subject to read, to minimize variability in 
explanation. If something was not understood, the researcher would repeat 
the main points until the subject acknowledged understanding. 
 
Stimuli 
The position of the coin was drawn from a Gaussian distribution which was 
centered on the center of the screen, and with a standard deviation (std) 
that was either low ( p=2.5% of screen width) or high ( P = 8.5% of screen 
width). This distribution was the prior of the experiment. Subjects were given 
the mean of the prior (“the coin throw is aimed at the screen center”) but not 
its variance, which they could only estimate from the distribution of previous 
coin throws. The standard deviation of the prior was kept constant within 
blocks, but changed across blocks. On every trial, a cluster of five dots was 
shown on the screen. The x-position of each of these dots was drawn 
independently from a second Gaussian distribution in which the mean was 
the coin’s horizontal location on that trial and the standard deviation was 
either low ( l = 6%) or high ( L = 15%). The distribution of these five dots 
defined the likelihood. The std of the likelihood was varied pseudo-randomly 
from trial to trial but counterbalanced across trials. We made the std of the 
likelihood vary pseudorandom from trial to trial so that subjects could not 
predict a priori the overall uncertainty that the trial would have. In total there 
were thus four conditions: low prior uncertainty and low likelihood 
uncertainty (pl); low prior uncertainty and high likelihood uncertainty (pL); 
high prior uncertainty and low likelihood uncertainty (Pl) and high prior 
uncertainty and high likelihood uncertainty (PL). The std values used were 
the same ones reported in (Vilares et al., 2012). 
101 
 
The colors and appearance of the stimulus were also identical to the ones 
reported in (Vilares et al., 2012) (see Figure 3.1-A). The screen units were 
normalized between 0 (the left edge) and 1 (the right edge). Stimulus 
presentation was performed using Matlab R2012a (MathWorks, Natick, MA). 
 
Task procedure 
Experimental blocks: At the onset of each trial, five blue likelihood dots were 
shown on the screen, where they remained until the end of the trial. 
Subjects had to move a blue vertical bar (the “net”) to estimate the coin 
position. Contrary to the task in (Vilares et al., 2012), in order for the 
subjects to move the net they had to press either the “left” or the “right” 
keyboard key (which would move the net, respectively, to the left or the 
right). Once they made their decision, they would press the space bar. The 
change from the mouse to the keyboard was done to help subjects perform 
the task, given that preliminary data suggested that older subjects had 
troubles using the mouse. Subjects could take as long as they wanted to 
decide where to place the net but had to wait for at least 1.26 seconds (to 
minimize accidental double presses counting as a response). After they 
pressed the button, the true position of the coin was revealed and subjects 
would get one point added to the score if the coin was inside the net. The 
cumulative score across the experiment was shown to the subjects at the 
end of each trial. A new trial would then begin 1.5 seconds later (see Figure 
3.1-A). Given that the net covered the entire height of the screen only the 
horizontal location was relevant, making this a one-dimensional estimation 
task.  Subjects completed two blocks of 150 trials each for a total of 300 
trials per experiment. The first block had a low prior uncertainty and the 
second one had a high prior uncertainty. We had to decrease the total 
number of blocks performed (in comparison with (Vilares et al., 2012)) 
because preliminary data indicated that subjects were getting too tired and 
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unwilling to do 600 trials. After finishing the 2 blocks in the second session, 
subjects also performed 100 trials of a control block. Each trial took an 
average of 8.5 seconds and the total experiment lasted on average 
approximately one hour. 
Control Block: The control block was performed immediately following 
completion of the two experimental blocks, on the second test session. The 
task was identical to the main experiment, with the only difference being that 
the coin’s location was shown at the onset of each trial and could be seen 
throughout, so there was no uncertainty about its position. The 100 trials 
comprising the control block were selected by randomly sampling 25 trials 
per condition from the main experiment blocks. Each trial of the control 
block repeated one of those sampled experimental trials, showing the same 
likelihood dot display that was shown in the experimental trial and using as 
the coin position the actual position to which the person moved the net at 
that trial. As in the main experiment, subjects were awarded one point for 
successfully moving the net to the coin’s position. This control block was 
done in order to understand if subjects were able to accurately move the net 
to the required place and press the button. All subjects included in the 
analysis were able to perform the control block without apparent problems. 
 
Data Analysis 
Bayesian modeling of behavior: In order to perform the task successfully, for 
every trial the subjects should place the net in the most likely location of the 
hidden coin. Bayes rule provides an optimal way to estimate this 
location(Kording and Wolpert, 2004): 
Xest= 
2
L/( 
2
L+  
2
P)P+ 
2
P/( 
2
L+  
2
P)L  (1) 
where Xest is the estimated position of the coin,  
2
L and  
2
P are the 
variances of the likelihood and of the prior, respectively, and L and P are 
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the respective means. For our experiment, the real P (the mean of the 
prior) is always a constant, in this case 0.5 (the center of the screen). The 
mean of the likelihood (L) for each particular trial can be considered the 
centroid of the cloud of dots, and it changes from trial to trial. We can then 
make a linear regression of the subject’s estimated coin position, Xest, as a 
function of the centroid of the cloud of dots. The slope of this linear 
regression, the Bayesian slope (s), characterizes how much the subject is 
weighting the current sensory information (likelihood), and, if people perform 
according to the optimum prescribed by Bayesian statistics, its value should 
be equal to the perceived  2P/( 
2
L+  
2
P). A slope of zero suggests that 
subjects do not take into account likelihood information, and a slope of one 
suggests that subjects only use likelihood information. A slope between zero 
and one indicates that subjects are using information from both prior and 
likelihood, and the larger the slope the more they rely on the likelihood and 
less on the prior.  
Subjects’ average reliance on likelihood vs. prior information: the slopes 
associated with each of the four conditions were averaged to get an 
estimate of an individual’s average reliance on likelihood information (i.e. 
(spl+ spL+sPl +sPL)/4).  
Subjects’ performance: The proportion of correct trials, for each condition, 
was calculated as the number of trials in which the subject accurately 
guessed the position of the coin, divided by the total number of trials in that 
condition.  
Sensitivity to prior uncertainty: Is the difference between the Bayesian 
slopes in one type of prior and the slopes in the other type of prior (i.e. ((sPl 
+sPL )-(spl+ spL))/2). 
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Sensitivity to likelihood uncertainty: Is the difference between the Bayesian 
slopes in one type of likelihood and the slopes in the other type of likelihood 
(i.e. ((spl+sPl )-( spL+sPL))/2). 
 
For the behavioral calculations, the first 20 trials of every block were 
discarded to minimize the effect of learning. 
Optimal values:  The Bayesian optimal values for the slopes can be 
obtained from  2P/( 
2
L+  
2
P), where  
2
P is the variance associated with the 
prior (with  2p=0.025
2 or  2P = 0.085
2 in unit-less screen coordinates) and  2L 
is the variance associated with the likelihood, which can be estimated by 
 
2
L= variance(cloud of dots)/ number of dots (so in our case,  
2
l=0.06
2/5 or 
 
2
L = 0.15
2/5). 
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3.4 Results 
In this study we wanted to understand how Parkinson’s disease (PD) 
patients learn and combine uncertain prior and current sensory information, 
and how it differs from controls. We recruited 15 PD patients and 15 age-
matched controls to perform a visual decision-making task. In this task, 
subjects had to guess where a hidden target (“coin”) would appear on a 
screen (see Figure 3.1 and (Vilares et al., 2012)). They received noisy visual 
information about the position of the target in the form of a dot-cloud which 
was centered at the true target position. To accurately estimate the position 
of the target, subjects could use both the prior, obtained from the distribution 
of previous target positions, and the likelihood, obtained from the displayed 
dots (see methods for details). The conditions comprised a two-by-two 
factorial design (Figure 3.1-B), with two levels of prior uncertainty (wide, 
more uncertain prior: P; and narrow, less uncertain prior: p) and two levels 
of likelihood uncertainty (wide likelihood: L; and narrow likelihood: 
l).   Subjects performed the task twice, with PD patients performing it once 
“on” medication (shortly after taking their dopaminergic medication) and 
once “off” medication (dopaminergic medication withdrawn overnight).  By 
varying prior and likelihood uncertainty, comparing healthy controls and 
patients and changing dopamine medication, we could study the specific 
effects of the disease and of dopamine in decision-making under 
uncertainty. 
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PD patients perform worse than age-matched controls 
First we wanted to understand if PD affected performance in the coin-
catching task. We found that, on average, patients (off-state) guessed 
where the hidden target was significantly fewer times than their age-
matched controls (p=0.03, t-test, n=15; see Figure 3.2-A).  Performing a 3-
way repeated measures ANOVA (population type x types of prior 
uncertainty x types of likelihood uncertainty) we can see that, besides the 
significant main effect of population type, there was also a significant main 
effect of both prior and likelihood uncertainty on performance (F(1,29)>16.6, 
p<0.001; see Figure 3.2-B), with higher levels of uncertainty leading to a 
decrease in performance.  This is not surprising, given that both types of 
uncertainty may be expected to change the precision of subjects’ estimates 
and thus their expected task performance. There were no significant 
interaction effects (F(1,29)<2.7, p>0.1). The difference in performance 
between the PD patients and controls does not seem to be related simply to 
lower motor ability, as there was no significant difference in how much 
patients and controls moved the net from the starting point (p=0.46, t-test, 
n=15). PD impaired performance in a task that varies uncertainty in both 
prior and current information. 
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Figure 3.2 - Performance in the task: average proportion of trials in which 
subjects correctly guessed the position of the target. Average ± standard error of 
the mean (SEM) for PD patients off-state (orange circles), PD patients on-state (red 
circles) and controls (black squares), averaged across conditions (A) or separated 
by condition (B). On average, PD patients performed significantly worse when they 
were off-state compared with when they were on-state (p=0.01, paired t-test, n=15) 
or compared to age-matched controls (p=0.03, t-test, n=15). 
 
Dopamine improves performance 
Next we wanted to understand how administration of dopaminergic 
replacement medication affects performance in the task. PD patients on-
state (i.e. when they have more dopamine in their system) performed 
significantly better compared with when they were off-state (p=0.01, paired 
t-test, n=15; see Figure 3.2-A), showing performance levels similar to 
controls (p=0.56, t-test, n=15).  A 3-way repeated measures ANOVA 
(medication state x types of prior uncertainty x types of likelihood 
uncertainty) showed, besides the significant main effect of medication, 
significant main effects of prior and likelihood uncertainty on performance 
(F(1,57)=7.8, p=0.015 and F(1,57)=109,p<0.001, ANOVA-rm; see Figure 3.2-B). 
There was also a significant interaction between the effects of medication 
and likelihood uncertainty (F(1,57)=4.5,p =0.038). The other interactions did 
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not reach significance (F(1,57)<3.7, p >0.05). Our results show that 
dopaminergic replacement medication improved performance in the task. 
 
No difference in the capacity of learning the prior uncertainty 
If PD affects the learning of the uncertainty in the prior, then we would 
expect PD patients (off-state) to not change behavior as much between 
blocks of different prior uncertainties, i.e. to be less sensitive to differences 
in prior uncertainty. The main behavioral measure in our experiment is the 
Bayesian slope per condition, i.e. the weight subjects place on current 
sensory information (likelihood) above prior beliefs (where 1 indicates full 
reliance on likelihood information and none on prior, and 0 indicates the 
opposite; see Methods for details). Thus, we would expect a smaller 
difference in the Bayesian slopes between the large prior uncertainty (P) 
and the small prior uncertainty (p) conditions. We do not find evidence for a 
different sensitivity to prior uncertainty between PD patients (off-state) and 
controls (p=0.86, t-test, n=15; see Figure 3.3), or between off and on states 
(p=0.23, paired t-test, n=15). PD patients seem to still be able to learn the 
different prior uncertainties as well as age-matched controls. 
 
Figure 3.3 - Sensitivity to prior uncertainty. It is calculated as the average 
difference in the Bayesian slope between the 2 types of prior uncertainty. No 
significant differences were found (p>0.05 for all comparisons). Error bars are SEM. 
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No significant difference in average weight given to current vs. prior 
information 
We also wanted to know if PD affects the average weight given to current 
sensory information versus prior beliefs, i.e. the average Bayesian slope. 
We did not find a significant difference in terms of average slope between 
PD patients (off-state) and controls (p=0.47, t-test, n=15; see Figure 3.4-A), 
or between PD patients in on vs. off-state (p=0.35, paired t-test, n=15; see 
Figure 3.4-B). Analyzing PD patients (off-state) and controls, we found a 
significant main effect of both prior and likelihood type (F(1,29)>29, p<0.001; 
see Figure 3.4-B), with subjects placing a higher weight on likelihood when 
likelihood uncertainty decreased or prior uncertainty increased. Qualitatively, 
this behavior would be expected if subjects are using a Bayesian strategy 
(Vilares and Kording, 2011). There was no significant interaction between 
population and prior types (F(1,29)=0.03, p=0.86), which agrees with the result 
shown previously that PD patients can distinguish differences in prior 
uncertainty as well as age-matched controls. However, there was a 
significant interaction effect between population and likelihood type 
(F(1,29)=11.6, p=0.002), i.e. patients and controls reacted differently to 
changes in likelihood uncertainty. Our results did not find an effect of PD on 
the average weight given to current vs. prior information, but show that PD 
patients and controls react differently to changes in current sensory 
uncertainty. 
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Figure 3.4 - Weight given to current vs. prior information (Bayesian slope), by 
condition. The slope quantifies the degree to which subjects rely on the current 
visual stimulus (likelihood) versus the prior, with 1 corresponding to full reliance on 
prior and none on likelihood, and 0 corresponding to the opposite. Average 
Bayesian slope ± SEM for PD patients off-state (orange circles), PD patients on-
state (red circles) and controls (black squares), averaged across conditions (A) or 
separated by condition (B). No significant differences were found for the average 
Bayesian slope (p>0.05 for all comparisons). 
 
PD patients are less sensitive to current sensory uncertainty 
To understand how PD patients react to changes in likelihood uncertainty 
(uncertainty in the current stimulus) we compared the slope between 
conditions of different likelihood uncertainty. We found that patients (off-
state) reacted significantly less to changes in likelihood uncertainty 
compared to controls (p=0.002, t-test, n=15; see Figure 3.5). When the prior 
was narrow (more precise), the difference in behavior was salient and the 
change in likelihood uncertainty had no significant influence for patients 
(p=0.55, paired t-test, n=15; see also Figure 3.4-B), while controls showed a 
solid effect (p=0.001, paired t-test, n=15). When the prior was wide (more 
uncertain), both groups showed an effect of likelihood uncertainty (p=0.002 
and p<0.001 for patients and controls, respectively, paired t-test, n=15). 
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Patients on-state did not differ significantly from either off-state (p=0.53, 
paired t-test, n=15; see Figure 3.5) or controls (p=0.052, t-test, n=15; see 
Figure 3.5) in their sensitivity to likelihood uncertainty. Together, our results 
indicate that PD patients, especially off-state, are less responsive to 
changes in the uncertainty of the current stimulus. 
 
 
Figure 3.5 - Sensitivity to likelihood uncertainty. It is calculated as the average 
difference in the Bayesian slope between the 2 types of likelihood uncertainty. PD 
patients off-state, relative to controls, are significantly less sensitive to differences in 
likelihood uncertainty (p=0.002, t-test, n=15). Error bars are SEM. 
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3.5 Discussion 
In this paper, we wanted to understand how Parkinson’s disease affects 
decision-making under uncertainty. We found that PD patients performed 
worse than age-matched controls in a task in which both prior and visual 
likelihood uncertainty was present, and that performance improved with 
administration of dopaminergic drugs. Looking at the way in which they 
detect and process uncertainty, we found that patients could learn prior 
uncertainty as well as controls and that they did not differ significantly in the 
average weight given to current vs. prior information. However, they showed 
diminished sensitivity to likelihood uncertainty, which was particularly 
pronounced in the context of a more certain prior. Parkinson disease 
specifically affected patients’ capacity to react to changes in current sensory 
uncertainty. 
If dopaminergic activity from the putamen directly encoded prior 
uncertainty, then we would have expected PD patients to be impaired at 
learning the prior uncertainty. However, while PD patients off-state showed 
impairments in performance, they were still able to learn the prior 
uncertainty as well as controls. Dopamine and the putamen have been 
previously implicated in learning of some tasks (Dayan and Balleine, 2002, 
McClure et al., 2003, Frank et al., 2004). Notably, however, they do not 
seem to be required for learning of all types of tasks. For example, in 
rodents, inhibiting neural activity from the dorsal striatum, which comprises 
both putamen and caudate, decreased performance in a task but not 
learning (Atallah et al., 2007). Similarly, rats in which the tonic dopamine 
levels were altered could still learn (Beeler et al., 2010). The effects of 
dopaminergic medication on learning also seem to depend on the specific 
task (Cools and Robbins, 2004, Frank, 2005). For example, in a study with 
PD patients, it was also found that dopaminergic drug state (on vs. off) 
impacted performance but not learning (Shiner et al., 2012). Dopaminergic 
medication increased learning in some tasks but actually decreased learning 
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in others (Frank et al., 2004, Frank et al., 2007, Moustafa et al., 2008, 
Pizzagalli et al., 2008). Thus, while dopaminergic activity from the putamen 
is important for some types of learning, our results indicate that it is not 
crucial for learning the prior uncertainty, suggesting that it does not directly 
encode prior uncertainty. 
If, as it has been proposed, dopamine activity affected the general 
weight given to current bottom-up sensory evidence (likelihood) vs. top-
down priors, i.e. the Bayesian slope (Beeler et al., 2010, Friston et al., 2012, 
Galea et al., 2012), then we would expect a difference between PD patients 
and controls in their average Bayesian slope. We did not find support for this 
hypothesis.  This may be due to a lack of statistical power given the 
heterogeneity of our sample, which included different stages of the disease, 
different medicine, and different ages; all factors that produce relevant 
heterogeneity in basal dopamine levels and hence on its effects (Cools and 
Robbins, 2004, Chowdhury et al., 2012). It may also be due to a ceiling 
effect, given that many subjects exhibited a high slope in some of the 
conditions. Nevertheless, the effects on the sensitivity to differences in 
likelihood uncertainty were much higher than the potential effects on the 
average Bayesian slope. Higher reliance on current stimuli and increased 
attention to it are probably factors that are often correlated in nature. 
However, it is worth noticing that increased attention to an uncertain 
stimulus may actually make someone rely less on it than if one was not as 
attentive and hence did not notice that the stimulus was uncertain. Our 
results do not support the role of dopamine in signaling the general weight 
given to current vs. prior information. 
If dopamine signals the level of current sensory uncertainty, 
putatively through increases of salience or attention given to the sensory 
stimulus, we hypothesized that PD patients should be impaired at reacting 
to differences in its uncertainty. Our results strongly supported this 
hypothesis. These results agree with a series of experiment and theories 
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that have been proposed about dopamine (Berridge and Robinson, 1998, 
Kapur, 2003, McClure et al., 2003, Dang et al., 2012). In this view, a given 
sensory stimulus, either because of its novelty, intensity, or potential 
importance for an animal’s fitness, will be particularly salient and activate a 
dopaminergic response that leads the animal pays more attention to it 
(Redgrave and Gurney, 2006). We propose that this increased attention will 
also enable the animal to better detect the uncertainty in the sensory 
stimulus, and hence respond appropriately to it. This is in accordance with 
the interpretation that attention is the inference about the uncertainty 
(precision) of a sensory signal (Feldman and Friston, 2010). It is also in 
accordance with a study that found that there is a specific loss of attentional 
mechanisms in PD which is independent of visual sensory deficits (Sampaio 
et al., 2011). Our data supports the role of dopamine in regulating attention 
to sensory stimuli as a means of signaling their uncertainty. 
The lack of sensitivity to the uncertainty in the current stimulus was 
particularly pronounced in the context of a more certain prior. A more 
uncertain prior may in itself also be a drive for increased attention to current 
stimuli, and hence could somewhat compensate for the patients’ general 
lack of attention to it. This also agrees with the results obtained in Galea et 
al. (2012), which showed that PD patients were slower to change behavior 
in response to an improbable stimulus when this stimulus was delivered in 
the context of an overall predictable sequence (i.e. a more certain prior), but 
not when the sequence was unpredictable (uncertain prior) (Galea et al., 
2012). It is of course possible that the dopaminergic activity from the 
putamen directly codes for the uncertainty (or its inverse, precision) in the 
current stimulus (Friston et al., 2012). However, if that would be the case 
then we would again expect a generalized increased/decreased reliance on 
likelihood. Previous research also does not support this hypothesis 
(McKeefry et al., 1997, Vilares et al., 2012).  The observed asymmetric 
sensitivity to likelihood uncertainty depending on the characteristics of the 
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prior further reinforces the idea that dopamine may not directly code for 
uncertainty in the current stimulus but, instead, help in signaling its 
uncertainty by increasing attention to it. 
We cannot be sure that the cause for the impairments we observed 
in PD patients is specifically related to the putamen, as transmission from 
other structures is also affected. Nevertheless, the putamen seems to be the 
brain structure most severely compromised in Parkinson’s disease (Kish et 
al., 1988), and so it is likely that the observed effects are at least partly due 
to a deficient dopaminergic transmission from the putamen. It would be 
interesting to perform a similar study with other patient populations that also 
have deficits in transmission from the putamen, such as Wilson’s disease  
(King et al., 1996). We predict that if the observed impairments are 
specifically related to activity from the putamen, then these patients will also 
show deficits in detecting differences in likelihood uncertainty.  
We did not find a significant improvement in the sensitivity to 
likelihood uncertainty after dopaminergic replacement therapy administration 
(i.e. when subjects where “on state”). Again this may be related with the 
high variability in our sample in terms of age, stage of the disease and type 
of dopaminergic medication, causing potentially more variable results (Cools 
and Robbins, 2004). Also, the effect of dopamine on a particular brain 
system follows an “inverted U-shaped” function, with both too much and too 
little dopamine impairing behavior, and the concentrations of dopamine 
given to the patients may not have been the optimal ones. Finally, 
dopaminergic drugs are administered outside the cells and probably do not 
completely replace the internally generated dopamine effects. It would be 
interesting to do a similar task with either never medicated patients or 
healthy controls, and see the effect different levels of dopamine 
administration could have on behavior. 
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The computational role of dopamine proposed here may help in the 
understanding of some of the symptoms both PD and schizophrenic patients 
show. It has been proposed that some of the schizophrenia symptoms can 
be related to an incorrect Bayesian inference process (Fletcher and Frith, 
2009). We subscribe this view, and suggest that they may be associated 
with the role of dopamine in attending to the current sensory stimulus and its 
uncertainty. Schizophrenics are suggested to have a deregulated dopamine 
transmission that leads to stimulus-independent release of dopamine 
(Kapur, 2003). Hence, this would lead the person to pay more attention to 
current sensory stimuli, even when there is no apparent reason for it. Some 
reports made by schizophrenics suggest exactly that: “Sights and sounds 
possessed a keenness that he had never experienced before”; or “My 
senses seemed alive…. I noticed things I had never noticed before (Bowers 
and Freedman, 1966, Bowers, 1968, Kapur, 2003). On the other side of the 
spectrum we have never medicated PD patients, who do not seem to have 
any interest in novel things (Bodi et al., 2009). If, as existing literature and 
our paper suggest, dopamine promotes paying attention to current sensory 
stimuli, this may help in the awareness of the specific difficulties both PD 
and schizophrenic patients face. In a way, we hope that our paper serves 
the role of dopamine itself. 
The neural signaling of uncertainty is among the central topics in 
computational neuroscience (Ma et al., 2006, Feldman and Friston, 2010, 
Fiser et al., 2010, Vilares and Kording, 2011). However, preciously little is 
known about the way the brain actually solves those problems. There exists 
a growing literature using fMRI studies asking how neural activities change 
with uncertainty (Critchley et al., 2001, Hsu et al., 2005, Behrens et al., 
2007, Vilares et al., 2012, O'Reilly et al., 2013). However, these studies 
cannot directly address causal roles of brain areas or neurotransmitters. 
Here we have used a different approach and started with a patient 
population that should, according to multiple theories, have deficits in the 
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signaling of uncertainty. Our findings of retained learning, unbiased slopes, 
but a lack of sensitivity to changes in current sensory uncertainty, promise to 
inform the development of new theories about the representation of 
uncertainty. 
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4.1 Summary 
Trust and reciprocity facilitate cooperation and are relevant to virtually all 
human interactions. They are typically studied using trust games: one 
subject gives (entrusts) money to another subject, which may return some of 
the proceeds (reciprocate). Currently, however, it is unclear whether trust 
and reciprocity in monetary transactions are similar in other settings, such 
as physical effort. Trust and reciprocity of physical effort are important as 
many everyday decisions imply an exchange of physical effort, and such 
exchange is central to labor relations. Here we studied a trust game based 
on physical effort and compared the results with those of a computationally 
equivalent monetary trust game. We found no significant difference between 
effort and money conditions in both the amount trusted and the quantity 
reciprocated. Moreover, there is a high positive correlation in subjects’ 
behavior across conditions. This suggests that trust and reciprocity may be 
character traits: subjects that are trustful /trustworthy in monetary settings 
behave similarly during exchanges of physical effort. Our results validate the 
use of trust games to study exchanges in physical effort and to characterize 
inter-subject differences in trust and reciprocity, and also suggest a new 
behavioral paradigm to study these differences. 
 
128 
 
 
  
129 
 
 
“But if you could not trust, you were indeed alone, for neither friendship nor 
partnership, neither family nor alliance could exist without it. Without trust, 
we were scattered far and wide, at the mercy of the four winds with nothing 
to cling to.” 
     Julliet Marillier 
 
4.2 Introduction 
Trust exists to some degree in all human interaction and is associated with a 
more healthy, egalitarian and productive society (Knack and Keefer, 1997, 
Camerer, 2003, Krueger et al., 2007). It can be defined as a positive 
expectation in the face of uncertainty emerging from social relations 
(Gambetta, 2000, Guseva and Rona-Tas, 2001). Trust enables cooperative 
behavior, facilitates organization in both permanent and temporary work 
groups and is associated with higher job satisfaction, lower labor cost and 
larger profits (Meyerson et al., 1996, Knack and Keefer, 1997, Gambetta, 
2000, Chami and Fullenkamp, 2001). It can be seen in diverse types of 
interactions: people trust money to bankers, hoping that they won’t run away 
with it; they trust their own home, letting complete strangers stay in their 
house  and they also trust physical effort, for example by helping a friend 
move (Guseva and Rona-Tas, 2001, Lauterbach et al., 2009). Across such 
situations trust plays different roles and it seems important to understand 
commonalities and differences.  
Trust is often justified as humans express reciprocity: they return 
helpful or harmful acts in kind, even though such behavior may come at a 
cost (Camerer and Fehr, 2002, Nowak and Sigmund, 2005). As in trust, 
reciprocity is also expressed in different situations: in the examples above, 
the banker will work harder to maximize the earnings of the trustful investor, 
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and a person that just stayed for free in someone else’s house will more 
likely consider hosting as well (Lauterbach et al., 2009). If two people 
interact repeatedly, then not reciprocating but exploiting the partner has to 
be weighted against the cost of losing collaboration in the future (McCabe et 
al., 2001, Nowak and Sigmund, 2005). If, however, partners only interact 
once, then there is no direct risk of such retaliation. Nevertheless, even in 
one-shot interactions humans tend to reciprocate, while this behavior is 
much more difficult to find in other species (Nowak and Sigmund, 2005). 
Reciprocity in single encounters is of special interest for economists since in 
the current global market the traditional long-term repeated interactions 
between relatives or neighbors are being slowly replaced by one-time 
interactions between anonymous partners (Nowak and Sigmund, 2005). A 
better understanding of reciprocity in one-shot interactions in all its different 
contexts can then be of particular relevance to the current economy. 
The importance of trust and reciprocity has been progressively 
recognized in the field of labor economics. Trust increases the ability of 
group members to work together (Dirks, 1999) and promotes reciprocity 
(Fehr and List, 2004). It also seems to affect effort. For example, intensive 
control by a supervisor may lead to decreased work effort because it is 
sensed as an indication of distrust (Frey, 1993, Guerra, 2002). Furthermore, 
trust within a group seems to affect their work effort, although the 
relationship between trust and effort is not very clear (Dirks and Ferrin, 
2001). Some studies suggest that higher levels of trust can increase effort 
and efficiency towards the group task (Klimoski and Karol, 1976, Dirks, 
1999). Paradoxically, it has also been proposed that in some situations 
people with low trust will actually work harder when in a group, in order to 
compensate for the putative low performance of the co-workers (Williams 
and Karau, 1991). Reciprocity, by its turn, not only reinforces trust but it can 
also increase employees working effort, functioning as an effective contract-
enforcement device (Fehr et al., 1997, Gachter and Falk, 2002). These 
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studies thus indicate that trust and reciprocity can affect effort, but how do 
they relate is still unclear.  
In the context of behavioral economics, trust and reciprocity are 
often studied using trust games (Berg et al., 1995, Camerer, 2003, Cesarini 
et al., 2008). In such a game, one individual (the trustor) receives a given 
amount of money, and can choose how much of it to trust or invest. The 
trusted amount is then multiplied by some factor, for example three 
(symbolizing a return on social investment), and given to the other player 
(the trustee). The trustee can then decide how much of the proceeds to 
keep and how much to return to the trustor. The amount of money invested 
by the trustor is a measure of trust, and the amount repaid back by the 
trustee is a measure of reciprocity. In this way, trust games allow quantifying 
both the degree of trust as well as the degree of reciprocity.  
Several studies have used trust games and the results have been 
contrary to what would be expected under the assumption of purely self-
interested individuals, who act in order to maximize their own payoff  
(Camerer and Fehr, 2002). In fact, if the trust game is played only once, 
then the optimal strategy of a purely self-interested trustee is to not 
reciprocate any money, and so the trustor, anticipating this, would invest 
nothing (Camerer, 2003, King-Casas et al., 2005). Thus, for a one-shot trust 
game, the Nash equilibrium (the solution in which no player can increase 
their payoff unilaterally) is to neither trust nor reciprocate. Instead, it has 
been found that people do trust and reciprocate even at a cost to their gains 
(Berg et al., 1995, Fehr and Gachter, 2000, Camerer, 2003). However, 
these results were generally obtained using exchanges of money, and how 
this “monetary trust and reciprocity” can extrapolate to other contexts, such 
as effort, is still largely unknown (Levitt and List, 2007). 
Trust and reciprocity of effort may have different properties when 
compared to trust and reciprocity of money. Studies have suggested that 
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trading effort instead of money can lead to different results, as it might 
increase the amount of cooperation (van Dijk et al., 2001) and can affect 
property rights (Fahr and Irlenbusch, 2000). Even in daily life this might be 
seen. For example, many people would easily give a day’s worth of work to 
help a friend to move, but would not so easily offer them an equivalent 
amount of money (van Dijk et al., 2001). There are thus indications that 
people are willing to entrust effort more than money. If trust and reciprocity 
differ between exchanges of money and effort, then caution is necessary 
when generalizing the results of the monetary trust games to the domain of 
effort.  
In this study, we wanted to know how people trust and reciprocate effort in 
the context of a trust game. Specifically, we focused on physical effort, as it 
can be readily measured. Each of our 60 subjects participated in two 
computationally equivalent trust games, one involving physical effort and 
one involving money. We found that there were no significant differences in 
trust and reciprocity between effort and monetary conditions. These results 
hold even if we analyze only the first game of each subject. We also found 
that, across the two conditions, trust and reciprocity were strongly 
correlated. Finally, we observed that, although on average subjects 
reciprocated identically in both effort and monetary conditions, there was a 
much higher variability in the proportion reciprocated for the effort condition.  
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4.3 Materials and methods 
 
Figure 4.1 - Experimental setup. A) Representation of the trust game used in this 
experiment. In each condition the trustor sends some amount I between 0 and 5 
units, units which in the monetary condition (on the left) are US $ and in the effort 
condition (on the right) are energy blocks (EB). This amount is then tripled and sent 
to the trustee, who can then return some quantity R of this tripled amount (3I). In the 
effort condition both players have then to do the remaining squats in order to arrive 
to 20 EB. Each subject plays each condition only once. They keep the same role 
throughout the entire experiment but change partners between conditions. B) 
Example image presented on the computer screen when subjects were performing 
the monetary condition part of the experiment. In this phase, the trustor (“player A”) 
had just received the 5 $ show-up fee and had to decide how much to send to the 
trustee (“player B”). C) Example image presented on the computer screen when 
subjects were performing the effort condition part of the experiment. In this phase, 
the trustee (“player B”) was performing squats in order to arrive to 5 EB. While 
squatting, the correspondent bar (blue for the trustee, red for the trustor) was going 
up and the total number of EB possessed by the trustee was shown (as a blue 
number next to the trustee’s rectangle). Once the trustee reached the 5 EB 
threshold the amount given by the trustor would be shown. 
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Participants: A total of 60 healthy volunteers (35 females, 25 males; age 30 
±9 years) participated in the experiment. All experimental protocols were 
performed in accordance with federal guidelines and the Northwestern 
University’s policy statement on the use of humans in experiments. Informed 
consent was obtained from all participants. 
 
Experimental procedure: Each experimental session consisted of a trust 
game presented in 2 conditions, monetary and physical effort. All subjects in 
the same session experienced the same sequence of events. The choice to 
start with the effort or the monetary condition was pseudorandom, so that 
half of the volunteers started with one condition, and the other half started 
with the other, to avoid any potential priming effects. Each subject played 
both conditions of the trust game once. Subjects were randomly assigned to 
be either player A (trustor) or player B (trustee) and kept that role throughout 
the experimental session. In order to minimize potential multi-round effects, 
subjects were randomly matched for the first condition of the experiment 
and changed partners between conditions. Players with the same role were 
placed in the same room, and were informed that they would only be playing 
with subjects that were in another room. They were instructed to not discuss 
strategies with one another. Furthermore, they were also informed that the 
person with whom they were playing would change between experiments. 
Subjects were given no information that enabled them to identify their 
partner and were also asked to keep their decisions private. They received 
written instructions. The instructions and the computer screen were phrased 
as neutral as possible; words like “trust”, “cooperation”, “competition” and 
“opponent” were avoided. An experimental session (including instructions, 
both experiments and waiting time) averaged 60 minutes. Earnings 
averaged $18 and ranged between $14 and $25. 
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The Game: In the monetary condition, both player A (trustor) and player B 
(trustee) received 5 US dollars ($5) as a show-up fee. Player A then decided 
to send all, none or some (in multiples of $0.25) of the show-up fee to player 
B. The amount sent to player B was tripled. Player B then decided how 
much of that money to send back to player A and how much to keep (see 
Figure 4.1-A). In the effort condition, both player A and player B had to 
perform squats while standing on a 4-sensor force-plate until each of them 
reached 20 “energy blocks” (EB). Initially both player A and player B had to 
perform squats until a total of 5 energy blocks was reached. Player A then 
had the opportunity of sending a portion of the 5 energy blocks (in multiples 
of 0.25) to player B. The amount of energy blocks sent to player B was 
tripled. Player B then decided how many energy blocks to return to player A 
(see Figure 4.1-A). Each player had then to perform the remaining squats in 
order to reach the 20 energy blocks required for the task. Each player 
received $10 for completing this part of the experiment. 
 
Data acquisition: Participants wrote their decisions in a box on a computer 
screen. At each point of time, the computer screen showed two rectangles, 
one at the left side of the screen with the amount of dollars/energy blocks 
possessed by player A (trustor) and one at the right side with the amount of 
dollars/energy blocks possessed by player B (trustee). Furthermore, a color-
code was given: red for the dollars/energy blocks earned by the trustor and 
blue for the ones earned by the trustee (see Figure 4.1-B and Figure 4.1-C). 
Subjects’ responses were recorded using Matlab. For the effort experiment, 
data was collected using a 4-sensor force-plate (Nintendo WiiTM Balance 
Board, recorded at 500Hz). By performing squatting movements with their 
body, subjects produced forces, which were then translated to Energy 
Blocks. 
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An energy block (EB) is a multiple of the work produced by that subject (W) 
per unit of mass (m): 
m
W
cEB t  
Where c is a constant, in this case c=1/4. Work was defined at each point of 
time t based on the forces recorded via: 



t
i
iiit tvFW
0
 
 Where Fi is the average force obtained by the 4-sensor force plate (in 
Newtons) at each iteration i, vi is the velocity and ti is the amount of time 
that passed between i-1 and i (which was, on average, about 0.035 s).  
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4.4 Results 
In this study we asked if trust and reciprocity differ between equivalent 
monetary and effort conditions of the trust game (see Figure 4.1). In one 
condition subjects traded money (in units of US$) and in the other they 
traded effort, which was measured in energy blocks (EB). We considered 
the amount sent by the trustor as absolute trust and the amount sent back 
by the trustee as absolute reciprocity, or trustworthiness. We also 
considered relative trust, the amount sent by the trustor divided by the total 
amount available (in our case, the total amount the trustor had available was 
5 $ or 5 EB) and relative reciprocity, the amount returned by the trustee 
divided by the total amount available (i.e. three times the amount sent by the 
trustor). Every subject participated in each condition once, changing 
partners between conditions. Subjects kept their role (trustor or trustee) 
throughout the experiment so that we could compare how they trusted or 
reciprocated across conditions. 
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No significant difference in trust between monetary and effort 
conditions 
We sought to test whether trust differs between monetary and effort 
conditions. We found that subjects displayed trusting behavior in both 
conditions (Figure 4.2-A), trusting $=3.1±0.3 $ in the monetary condition 
and similarly w=3.1±0.3 EB in the effort condition. Both averages were 
significantly different from zero, which is the Nash equilibrium for this game 
(p-val$=1.6x10
-6 and p-valw =1.5x10
-6, Wilcoxon signed-rank test). No 
significant difference in trust was found when comparing the monetary and 
effort conditions (p-val= 0.96; Wilcoxon signed-rank test; n=30). Comparing 
the distribution functions (see Figure 4.2-B) also no difference can be found 
(p-val=1, two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test). This lack of difference 
between trust in the monetary and effort conditions surprised us, as we had 
expected subjects to trust more in the effort condition of the task.  
We wondered if the lack of a statistical difference was due to an 
insufficient sample size. We therefore performed a power analysis asking 
which effect size we should have detected 90% of the time, at a =.05 level 
of significance. We found that with the variance present in the data and the 
number of subjects used we should have been able to observe a difference 
if it had exceeded 15%. Therefore, a difference between both conditions, if 
existent, should be smaller than this value. Trusting behavior in our 
experiment, thus, seems very similar between the monetary and the effort 
conditions.  
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Figure 4.2 - Quantity sent by the trustor, which is considered a measure of 
trust. A) Average trust in the monetary and the effort conditions (black and white, 
respectively). No significant difference in trust was found comparing the monetary 
and effort conditions (p-val= 0.9587; Wilcoxon signed-rank test; n=30). Error bars 
represent standard error of the mean (s.e.m.). B)  Cumulative distribution function 
for the amount sent by the trustor for the monetary (solid line) and the effort (dashed 
line) conditions. The distribution functions are not statistically different (p=1, two-
sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test; n=30). 
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No significant difference in reciprocity between monetary and effort 
conditions 
We also wanted to know if reciprocating behavior differs between a 
monetary and an effort condition. We found that subjects reciprocated in 
both conditions (Figure 4.3-A), returning $=4.9 ±0.6 $ in the monetary 
condition and w=4.8±0.6 EB in the effort condition. The averages were 
again significantly different from zero, the Nash equilibrium (p-val$=1.6x10
-6 
and p-valw =2.5x10
-6, Wilcoxon signed-rank test). The same is observed if 
we look at the relative reciprocity ($=0.49 ±0.03$ and w=0. 54±0.05 EB, p-
val$=1.5x10
-6 and p-valw =2.4x10
-6, Wilcoxon signed-rank test). No 
significant difference in absolute reciprocity was found comparing the 
monetary and effort conditions (p-val = 0.95; paired t-test). Comparing 
relative reciprocity, there might be a trend for reciprocating more in the effort 
condition, but the difference is not significant (p-val =0.27; paired t-test). 
Looking at the cumulative distribution functions of monetary versus effort 
reciprocity (see Figure 4.3-B) no significant difference can be found (p-val 
=0.76, two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test). A power analysis (as above) 
gives an upper limit of 14%, so any real difference, if it exists, should be 
smaller than that value. These results indicate that reciprocity does not differ 
significantly between the monetary and effort conditions, and in both cases 
subjects reciprocated more than predicted by Nash equilibrium. 
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Figure 4.3 – Quantity sent back by the trustee, which is considered a measure 
of (absolute) reciprocity. A) Average reciprocity in the monetary and the effort 
conditions (black and white, respectively). No significant difference was found 
comparing the monetary and effort conditions (p= 0.9519; paired t-test; n=30). Error 
bars represent s.e.m. . B) Cumulative distribution function for the amount returned 
by the trustee for the monetary (solid line) and the effort (dashed line) conditions. 
The distribution functions are not statistically different (p=0.76, two-sample 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test; n=30). 
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Significant individual correlations 
We wanted to test if, at an individual level, a subject’s behavior in the 
monetary condition was correlated to behavior in the physical effort 
condition. We designed the experiment so that each subject participated in 
one monetary and one effort condition in random order and thus we can 
analyze correlations across the conditions. We found a high positive 
correlation in subjects’ trusting behavior between the monetary and effort 
conditions (r=0.74, p-val <10-5, spearman correlation; see Figure 4.4). We 
also found a significant but weaker correlation in reciprocating behavior 
(r=0.39, p-val =0.032 for absolute reciprocity; r=0.48, p-val =0.008 for 
relative reciprocity; spearman correlations, n=30; see Figure 4.4). Thus, 
subjects’ behavior was positively correlated between conditions, with 
subjects that trusted or reciprocated more in a monetary condition tending to 
be more trusting /trustworthy in a physical effort condition. 
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Figure 4.4 - Relationship between a subject’s relative trust or relative 
reciprocity in the monetary and effort conditions. Each trustor is represented by 
a black dot (n=30) and each trustee is represented by a grey cross (n=30). When 
dots or crosses overlap a small number is shown nearby, representing the amount 
of overlapping dots (in black) or crosses (in grey). The black solid line represents a 
linear regression of the relative amount trusted in the effort condition as a function 
of the relative trust in the monetary condition (=0.71, p-val=1.6x10
-6,
 r
2
=0.57). The 
grey dashed line represents a linear regression of the relative amount reciprocated 
in the effort condition as a function of the relative amount reciprocated in the 
monetary condition (=0.84, p-val=6.9x10
-3
, r
2
=0.23). 
 
To better understand how people reciprocate trust, we analyzed the 
correlations between subjects’ investment and what they received back from 
the trustee. We found significant positive correlations between the amount 
subjects trust and what they receive back from the trustee, for both the 
monetary (r$=0.93, p-val$ <10
-8) and the effort (r w =0.73, p-valw <10
-5) 
conditions. The high correlation between trusted and returned amounts can 
be expected, since more trust provides more money or energy blocks that 
can be returned. However, looking at the correlations between the relative 
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values (relative trust with relative reciprocity), they are much weaker in the 
monetary condition (r$=0.38, p-val$=0.04), and disappear in the effort 
condition (rw =-0.14, p-valw =0.45). Thus, subjects give back more if they 
receive more, although the relative reciprocity does not appear to depend 
strongly on the relative trust.  
We also wanted to know how trustor’s behavior in the second round 
was correlated to behavior of the trustee in the first round. We found a 
strong positive correlation (r=0.73, p-val <10-5, n=30, spearman correlation) 
between the absolute amount received in the first round and what is trusted 
in the second round. Thus, as it has been observed before (King-Casas et 
al., 2005), positive interactions in one round are correlated with cooperative 
behavior in the next. 
To understand if this correlation is due to a causal influence of 
trustee’s behavior in round one on trustor’s behavior in round two, we 
constructed a multiple linear regression model in which both trust and 
reciprocity in round one are used as predictors of trust in round two. 
According to the model’s fit, trust in the first round influences trust in the 
second (b=0.58, p-val=0.01), which would be expected if trusting is a 
character trait. We found that the behavior of the trustee in round one, on 
the other hand, had no significant influence (b=0.14, p-val=0.22), which 
would be expected if trustors take into consideration that they are playing 
with two distinct individuals. It appears that subjects begin the study with a 
certain level of trust, which is shared between the monetary and the effort 
conditions, and that they do not significantly update that level based on 
experience during the first round. 
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Behavior using only the first round 
It is possible that the similarity across rounds occurred because subjects 
simply decided to behave in the second round in the same way they did 
during the first. To rule out this hypothesis we compared behavior using only 
the first round of the game. In this way, every subject only contributes one 
independent data point (see Figure 4.5). Subjects trusted $=2.8 ±0.4 $ and 
w=3.4±0.5 EB and reciprocated a total of $=4.3 ±0.8 $ and w=4.6±0.8 EB 
(values significantly different from zero, p-val =6.1x10-5 for all cases, 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test, n=15). The relative returns follow the same 
tendency ($=0.47 ±0.04 $ and w=0.50±0.06 EB; p-val =6.1x10
-5). 
Comparing the monetary and effort conditions, there was a tendency for 
higher trust and reciprocity in the effort condition, but this difference is also 
non-significant (p=0.35 for trust and p=0.68 or p=0.69 for absolute and 
relative reciprocity; Wilcoxon rank-sum test, n=15). Thus, the observed 
similarity across conditions does not seem to be a result of the repeated 
nature of the experiment. 
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Figure 4.5 - Trust and reciprocity values using only data from the first round. 
A) Average amount sent by the trustor (trust) in the monetary and the effort 
conditions (black and white, respectively), using only data from the first round. No 
significant difference in trust was found comparing the monetary and effort 
conditions (p-val= 0. 346; Wilcoxon rank-sum test, n=15). B) Average amount 
reciprocated by the trustee in the monetary and the effort conditions (black and 
white, respectively), using only data from the first round. No significant difference 
was found comparing the monetary and effort conditions (p= 0.68; Wilcoxon rank-
sum test, n=15). Error bars represent s.e.m. . 
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No gender differences 
To test if there were any gender differences in our results, we compared 
male and female behavior in the different conditions. For both the monetary 
and the effort conditions, we found no significant difference between males 
and females in both the amount trusted (p-val$=0.45 and p-valw=1; Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test; n♀=17 and n♂=13) and the amount reciprocated (p-val$=1 
and p-valw=0.54 for absolute reciprocity; p-val$=0.37 and p-valw=0.58 for 
relative reciprocity ; Wilcoxon rank-sum test; n♀=18 and n♂=12). Also, 
analyzing separately males and females, we found no differences between 
behavior in the monetary and the effort condition, in both the amount trusted 
(p-val♀=0.17 and p-val♂=0.45; Wilcoxon signed-rank test) and the amount 
reciprocated (p-val♀=0.59 and p-val♂=0.46 for absolute reciprocity; p-
val♀=0.41 and p-val♂=0.38 for relative reciprocity; Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test). This lack of gender differences suggests that the similarity between 
behavior in the monetary and the effort conditions does not seem to depend 
on the person’s gender. 
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Strategies used 
To better understand the strategies used, we graphically analyzed subjects’ 
decisions (Figure 4.6). We observed more variability in the strategies 
employed in the effort condition. For example, in the effort condition subjects 
sometimes returned everything or nothing, neither of which happened in the 
monetary condition. In fact, in the monetary condition the vast majority of the 
trustees (93%) reciprocated between 1/3 (return exactly what was trusted) 
and 2/3 (split total earnings), while in the effort condition this percentage, 
although still high, decays to 70%. All trustors sent something to the 
trustees, almost all the trustees returned something, and the vast majority of 
the trustees (93% in the monetary, 87% in the effort condition) returned the 
same or more than the trustor sent. In several cases, (2 in the effort, 8 in the 
monetary condition) the trustor sent the entire show-up fee to the trustee, 
and the trustee returned 2/3 of it back – this point may be considered fair 
and efficient, since it maximizes the total money/EB to be shared and it 
divides it equitably. Most subjects appear to have followed simple decision-
rules in both conditions, and the strategies employed in the effort condition 
seem more variable. 
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Figure 4.6 - Distribution of joint earnings or effort. A) Representation of trustor’s 
and trustee’s earnings in the monetary condition(figure similar to the one presented 
in (Berg et al., 1995)). Each subject pair/output of a round is represented by a filled 
dot. When dots overlap a small number is shown near the dot, representing the 
amount of overlapping dots. The outer triangle shows the set of possible earning 
pairs. The lines represent different possible relative reciprocity values (how much of 
the tripled amount sent by the trustor the trustee sent back): (1) if the relative return 
(pr) is equal to zero (“give back nothing” line), it means that the trustee keeps all the 
money; (2) when pr =1/3, the trustee sends back the exact amount trusted(dashed 
line), so the trustor neither wins nor loses. Points that fall to the left of this line 
indicate that the trustor lost something by trusting, while points at the right of the line 
indicate the opposite; (3) if pr=1/2, the trustee decides to split the tripled investment 
in half (dashdot line); (4) when pr =2/3$, the trustee splits in half the total earnings, 
inclusive of show-up fees (dotted line); (5) finally , when pr =1$ the trustee returns 
the total of the tripled investment, which is the maximum he can return(“give all 
back” line). Dots more near the line confluence vertex of the triangle indicate that 
the trustor showed lower trust, while dots more near the “trustor gives all” line 
represent high trust by the trustor. A total number of n=30 subject pairs is 
represented. B) Analogous figure to the one represented in (A), but in which what is 
represented is the total effort (number of energy blocks that each player had to 
perform throughout the entire experiment). The triangle here is inverted since 
increasing trusts decreases the total effort necessary to finish the task (arriving at 
20 EB). A total number of n=30 subject pairs is represented. 
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Higher behavioral variability in the effort condition 
To further analyze if the behavior is indeed more variable in the effort 
condition, we computed the dispersion patterns in both conditions (Figure 
4.7). Relative reciprocity, although its average does not differ across 
conditions (recall Figure 4.3), has more variance in the effort condition. 
Testing for a difference in the variances gives a significant p-value (p=0.002, 
paired-variance test, n=30). A similar trend can be observed when looking 
only at the first round (Fig 7 B), although the result is not significant (p=0.19, 
Bartlett's variance test, n=15). Thus, when subjects traded effort they 
showed a significantly higher variability of relative reciprocity values. 
 
 
Figure 4.7 - Box plots of the relative reciprocity obtained for the monetary and 
effort conditions. In A) all data was used (n=30), while in B) just the data 
concerning the first experiment made by each subject was used (n=15). The middle 
horizontal dashed line represents the median (50
th
 percentile), the lower horizontal 
solid line represents the minimum; the bottom and top of the box are the percentile 
25
th
 and 75
th
, and the upper horizontal solid line represents the maximum of the 
data. Note that when no upper black line can be seen it is because the 75
th
 
percentile and the maximum are the same. 
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4.5 Discussion 
Here we analyzed if trust and reciprocity differ between monetary and effort 
conditions. Our original hypothesis, based on everyday observations, was 
that subjects in the effort condition would trust and reciprocate more. 
However, we found that across the monetary and the physical condition 
subjects showed the same level of trust and reciprocity. Moreover, subjects’ 
behavior across conditions was highly correlated. The only significant 
difference was in the variability of behavior, with subjects showing a wider 
range of relative reciprocity values in the effort condition. 
Subjects in both conditions trusted and were trustworthy, sending on 
average more than half of their monetary earnings or accumulated effort to 
the other player. The levels of trust and reciprocity observed in the monetary 
condition are similar to those of analogous monetary experiments reported 
in the literature (Berg et al., 1995, Fehr et al., 2003). Interestingly, these 
trusting and reciprocity values were obtained not only when subjects traded 
money but also when they traded physical effort, suggesting that people’s 
tendency to trust and reciprocate also applies to physical effort decisions. 
Previous studies in movement effort decision-making have found 
some similarities between the decisions made in effort contexts and the 
ones generally made in monetary settings. For example, in a study in which 
subjects had to move in order to receive rewards or avoid punishment 
(Dam, 2009), subjects displayed behaviors such as loss aversion and 
diminishing returns, phenomena typically described in monetary settings 
(Maloney et al., 2007). Here, we show that this similarity between movement 
and economic decisions also extends to social decisions. 
Recent research has examined trust and reciprocity in an experiment 
in which physical effort was involved (Fahr and Irlenbusch, 2000). In a one-
shot trust game, subjects had to expend effort, specifically crack walnuts, in 
order to receive money, which they could then use in a trust game. Both 
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trustors and trustees tended to give more money to subjects that had 
worked – it is as if the work had resulted in “property rights”. In this 
experiment only money was traded and the authors focused on how effort 
affected the interactions in a trust game, while in our study we asked how 
the nature of traded units affects behavior and therefore we could ask if trust 
and reciprocity are shared across these domains. 
Our results show, even on the individual level, that trust and 
reciprocity are very similar between the monetary and the effort conditions. 
This can indicate that trust and reciprocity may be character traits. This idea 
is supported by previous studies, which also reported high correlations 
between cooperative behaviors in a trust game paradigm (meaning trust and 
trustworthiness) and specific personality traits (Glaeser et al., 1999, Burks et 
al., 2003, Fehr et al., 2003, Evans and Revelle, 2008). There has been also 
some indication that part of this cooperative behavior in trust games can be 
heritable, with monozygotic twins behaving in a more similar way when 
compared to dizygotic twins (Cesarini et al., 2008). Our results contribute to 
the view that trust and reciprocity are true character traits.  
Why would trust and reciprocity be shared across monetary and 
effort conditions? Trust and reciprocity have governed social interactions 
over evolutionary timescales, and it was thus suggested that they could tap 
into ancient neural systems involved in social cooperation or even directly 
into reward pathways (McCabe et al., 2001, Rilling et al., 2002, King-Casas 
et al., 2005, Miller, 2005, Knoch et al., 2006). Since cooperation for joint 
effort is older than monetary cooperation, we should expect an increased 
reliance on these primitive pathways. We thus suggest that the behavioral 
correlation observed between monetary and physical effort conditions may 
be a result of shared neural substrates. In future studies, this hypothesis 
could be tested experimentally using neuroimaging approaches. 
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Another interesting future study to perform would be to check the 
specific effects of property rights on behavior in the money and effort 
conditions. In our experiment, while in the effort condition people worked to 
arrive at 5 energy blocks that they then traded, in the monetary condition 
people received the $5 as a show up fee without having to work for it. This 
created a potential difference in the property rights people could feel about 
the trading units. Surprisingly, this potential difference between conditions 
did not result in a measurable difference in behavior. It would be interesting 
to test the effects on behavior when property rights are elicited for the 
monetary version, for example by having subjects solve a given number of 
puzzles in order to get the initial $5. We hypothesize that this could create 
an even higher similarity between behavior in the monetary and the effort 
conditions. 
The only difference we found across the conditions was that relative 
reciprocity is more variable in the effort condition. This difference can be due 
to a higher variance of fitness levels across the subject pool compared to 
variance of average earnings, although this is unlikely the only cause as this 
higher variability is not exhibited in trusting behavior. It is also possible that 
reciprocity of effort has less stringent social norms. Given that money is 
typically easily quantified and carries very strong emotional values (Krueger, 
1986), there can be specific social norms on what someone should 
reciprocate monetarily, but these social norms may be less stringent when it 
comes to effort retribution. These hypotheses could be tested in future 
experiments by changing the pool of participants as well as the social 
framing of the experiment. 
The fact that the behavior in both effort and monetary conditions was 
similar and correlated has two major methodological implications. First, it 
validates the use of the typical monetary trust game as an effective tool to 
study trust and reciprocity. Second, it opens the possibility of studying trust 
and reciprocity using physical effort tasks. Effort based tasks may have a 
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number of advantages. One advantage is that such experiments may be 
done cheaply over a wide range of investments (from a single squat to 
hours of hard workout). Furthermore, it can be a good alternative when 
comparing trust games across different countries, with different monetary 
units and/or different purchasing power, as the value of each energy block is 
less likely to be influenced by the country from which a person is from. 
Finally, it can allow for a better sampling of the population, as it is easier 
(and probably cheaper) to get a wider coverage of the population’s physical 
effort cost functions than of the monetary cost functions, and can thus offer 
us a bigger and more representative set of behaviors. The physical effort 
condition that we introduced here may be seen as a new tool to study trust 
and reciprocity, complementing the use of monetary trust games. 
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“It is the uncertainty that charms one. A mist makes things wonderful.” 
      Oscar Wilde 
5. FINAL DISCUSSION 
 
This thesis set itself to a special endeavor: reducing the uncertainty in 
uncertainty. Not that there is anything wrong with it: uncertainty is 
everywhere and, indeed, a little bit of it makes things interesting. 
Nevertheless, we spend a lot of time thinking (and sometimes worrying!) 
about decisions that have uncertainty associated, and so it is kind of 
comforting to know that our brain has mechanisms to deal with it in quite an 
acceptable way. 
 
5.1 This thesis: brief overview and conclusions 
 
5.1.1 Neural correlates of Bayesian statistics 
We started by asking which brain areas represent uncertainty in both prior 
beliefs and current sensory information (likelihood). We found, in chapter 2, 
that both prior and likelihood uncertainty showed specific neural correlates. 
Moreover, we found that they have very distinct, non-overlapping 
representations: Higher prior uncertainty was associated with greater 
activations in specialized brain areas including the putamen, amygdala, 
insula and OFC. Likelihood uncertainty, in contrast, was associated with 
increased activations in higher level visual areas inside the traditional visio-
motor pathway. Our findings suggest that, besides behaviorally, prior and 
likelihood uncertainty can also be distinguished neuronally. 
We also found, in chapter 2, that activity from the putamen was not 
only correlated with increased prior uncertainty but also with subjects’ 
sensitivity to differences in uncertainty and average reliance on current vs. 
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prior information. This indicates that the putamen may play a special role in 
decision-making under uncertainty. However, which specific role was 
unclear: it could be involved in directly encoding prior uncertainty, in 
signaling the weight given to current vs. prior information, or in attending to 
the current information. Moreover, as any fMRI data, our imaging results are 
correlational. In order to try to infer the specific causal role of putamen in 
decision-making under uncertainty we then performed the experiment 
reported in chapter 3. 
We discovered that Parkinson’s disease (PD) patients, who due to 
their condition have deficits in dopaminergic transmission from the putamen, 
were impaired in decision-making under uncertainty. Some aspects 
remained conserved: PD patients were still able to learn the different prior 
uncertainties as well as controls, and did not show significant differences in 
the average weight given to current vs. prior information. However, PD 
patients were impaired at reacting to changes in current sensory 
uncertainty, and this impairment was especially noticeable when the 
patients were off dopaminergic medication. Our findings suggest that 
dopaminergic activity from the putamen may be essential for processing 
uncertainty in current sensory information. 
So what may be the specific role of putamen? From both our fMRI 
and patient results, we suggest that its function may be to promote the 
person to seek and attend to new incoming sensory information. In this way 
the putamen would be more active when the prior is more uncertain, 
signaling that more information has to be gathered. In contrast, less capacity 
for putamen activation (as in the case of PD patients) would result in less 
attention to the current stimulus, and hence less responsiveness to its 
characteristics (such as its uncertainty). This is also in agreement with 
previous literature. A need for increased gathering and attention to new 
stimuli should be more prevalent when the information is ambiguous and/or 
is still being learned, all cases in which putamen activity was found to be 
higher  (Grafton et al., 1995, Hsu et al., 2005, Lehericy et al., 2005, Poldrack 
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et al., 2005, Doyon et al., 2009, Orban et al., 2010). Furthermore, 
anatomically the putamen (together with the rest of the basal ganglia) 
serves as a relay area, receiving inputs from sensory areas and projecting 
to motor effector systems in the brainstem and cortex (Albin et al., 1989, 
Whalen, 1998, Rolls, 2000, Singer et al., 2009), and hence it is in an ideal 
position to facilitate behavioral change to gather relevant new information 
(Whalen, 1998). Finally, the putamen is also closely connected with reward 
areas, and could thus easily combine the need for more information with its 
potential relevance (Rolls, 2000, Preuschoff et al., 2006, Rangel et al., 
2008).  
 
5.1.2 Role of dopamine in decision-making under uncertainty 
The results obtained in chapter 3 can also give us insights into the role of 
dopamine in decision-making under uncertainty. Indeed, the main 
pathological hallmark of Parkinson’s disease is a pronounced loss of 
dopamine-producing neurons in the substantia nigra pars compacta, which 
leads to a drastic depletion of dopamine in the striatum, to which these 
neurons project (Lotharius and Brundin, 2002). Hence, the differences we 
observed between PD patients and age-matched controls are likely related 
to an abnormal dopaminergic transmission (Riederer and Wuketich, 1976). 
A potential explanation of why dopamine would be affecting the processing 
of uncertainty in current sensory information is if it drives the subjects to 
attend to the current information and, by doing so, the subjects also notice 
its uncertainty more. In contrast, if the subjects are not attending to the 
current information, they will rely on it in a similar way regardless of its 
specific uncertainty. This is in accordance with the interpretation that 
attention is the inference about the uncertainty (or conversely, the precision) 
of a sensory signal (Feldman and Friston, 2010). It is also in agreement with 
previous literature involving dopamine in attention and saliency of a stimulus 
(Berridge and Robinson, 1998, Kapur, 2003, McClure et al., 2003). 
164 
 
According to this view, if a sensory stimulus is novel, intense or potentially 
important for an animal’s fitness, then it will activate a dopaminergic 
response, and this will lead the animal to direct attention to it (Redgrave and 
Gurney, 2006).  We propose that this increased attention fomented by 
dopamine will also enable the animal to better detect the uncertainty in the 
current sensory stimulus, and hence respond appropriately to it. 
Another interpretation by why dopamine would be affecting the 
processing of current sensory uncertainty (chapter 3) could be that it directly 
codes for the uncertainty (or its inverse, precision) in the current stimulus 
(Friston et al., 2012). However, under these considerations we would expect 
PD patients, when compared to controls, to have a generalized 
increase/decrease reliance on current information, which we do not find. 
Furthermore, based on a technique that allows distinguishing between 
sensory perception and attentional mechanisms, a previous study found that 
PD patients had a specific loss of attentional mechanisms that was 
independent of low level sensory processing deficits (Sampaio et al., 2011). 
Also, if it directly codes for the uncertainty in the current stimulus one would 
expect the brain areas more related with major dopaminergic pathways to 
be more active with increased current sensory uncertainty, and that is not 
what we observed in chapter 2. Together, these results indicate that 
dopamine may not directly code for uncertainty in the current stimulus but, 
instead, help in signaling its uncertainty by increasing attention to it. 
 
5.1.3 Dealing with social uncertainty as a potential character trait 
In chapter 4 we found that subjects playing a trust game trusted and 
reciprocated this trust, and that they did it regardless of what was being 
traded, money or physical effort. Moreover, we found that there was a 
significant positive correlation in the way subjects behaved across the two 
situations. Trust, especially in an anonymous one shot-interaction (in which 
no specific information from the other player is known), can be considered a 
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way of measuring how someone deals with social uncertainty (Gambetta, 
2000, Guseva and Rona-Tas, 2001). The fact that, even on the individual 
level, trust was similar between monetary and physical effort conditions 
indicates that the way people deal with social uncertainty may be a 
character trait.  
 Together with the results of the other chapters, these data suggest 
that there may be individual bias in how people respond to a given type of 
uncertainty. For example, when dealing with uncertainty in non-social 
current and prior information, subjects displayed different general 
tendencies in how much they decided to rely on current vs. prior information, 
which was shown by their different average Bayesian slopes (chapter 2 and 
3). Moreover, these tendencies had a neural correlate: they correlated with 
how much, on average, subjects’ putamen was differentially active in the 
task (chapter 2). Furthermore, when dopaminergic activity was 
compromised (as is the case with PD patients) we observed a diminished 
behavioral sensitivity to differences in current sensory uncertainty (chapter 
3). This is in agreement with previous research: for example, anxious people 
and animals react differently to uncertainty, and these differences may be 
related to specific neuromodulators (Nader and Balleine, 2007, Tsetsenis et 
al., 2007). The results presented in this thesis reinforce the idea that there 
may be individual traits in how someone deals with uncertainty, be it social 
or non-social, and that these may have a neuronal explanation.  
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5.2 Limitations of the work and future research 
Although we found specific brain correlates for prior and likelihood 
uncertainty, it is possible that uncertainty may be represented differently for 
other types of tasks. For example, one question that could be asked is if 
likelihood uncertainty would still be represented in high-level visual areas if 
the uncertainty was not explicitly obtained from the characteristics of the 
stimulus per se (in this case, dot spread). To answer this question, we will 
use a similar version of the task utilized in chapter 2 and 3 but in which 
likelihood uncertainty is provided implicitly. This will be achieved by having 
only one likelihood dot, have this likelihood dot display different colors 
depending on the uncertainty of the likelihood information, and have 
subjects learn the color-uncertainty correspondence. In this way, the dot still 
transmits information about the likelihood uncertainty, but this uncertainty is 
not directly related with the characteristics of the stimulus itself (one color 
per se will not be more or less uncertain than the other). We can then 
compare trials in which likelihood uncertainty is provided explicitly (high vs. 
lower spread of dots) with trials in which likelihood uncertainty is provided 
implicitly (learned correspondence between a color and a given uncertainty 
level), and see if they activate different brain regions. 
 The prior used in the task from chapters 2 and 3 required learning 
and memory. Indeed, although subjects were explicitly told the mean of the 
prior (“the thrower is aiming the coin towards the middle”), they were not told 
the variance/uncertainty in it, and had to learn it from experience. It is 
possible that a very different brain activation pattern would be seen if the 
prior uncertainty was told/shown explicitly and did not need to be learned 
through experience (d'Acremont and Bossaerts, 2012). To address this 
question, we will have subjects perform a similar task but in which the prior 
is given explicitly and does not need to be learned, for example by having 
the distribution shown in the background.  
It would be interesting to further investigate the role of putamen in 
decision-making under uncertainty. From the results of chapter 2 alone we 
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were initially expecting prior uncertainty processing to also be affected, 
which was not what we observed. It is possible that putamen activity still has 
a role in prior uncertainty processing, but that is independent from 
dopamine. A possible future study that could elucidate this role further would 
be to administer a similar task to other patient populations that also have 
deficits in transmission from the putamen, but in which these deficits are not 
directly related with a lack of dopamine, such as patients with Wilson’s 
disease (King et al., 1996). 
We considered the effects of dopamine, but it is possible (and even 
likely) that other neurotransmitters may also be involved in decision-making 
under uncertainty. For example, acetylcholine has been implicated in 
signaling expected uncertainty, while norepinephrine would signal 
unexpected uncertainty (Yu and Dayan, 2005). It is also quite possible that 
different concentrations of the same neuromodulator will give rise to 
different effects (Cools and Robbins, 2004). Future research could examine 
the effect of each neuromodulator and its concentration in decision-making 
under uncertainty, either directly by administration of the corresponding 
neuromodulator in different quantities, or indirectly by looking at genetic 
polymorphisms. 
Another exciting area of investigation would involve understanding 
how the way people deal with uncertainty generalizes. It has been found, in 
a visio-motor rotation task, that changes to prior uncertainty in one reaching 
direction affect the perception of prior uncertainty in other directions, i.e. it 
generalizes, even though no training occurred in those directions 
(Fernandes et al., 2012). It was also found that prior uncertainty in that 
visuo-motor rotation task generalizes more broadly than the mean of the 
prior (Fernandes et al., 2012). It would be interesting to know if the way 
people react to uncertainty in a visual decision-making task (such as ours) 
can generalize to how they react to uncertainty in other domains, for 
example social domains, and what are the neural substrates involved. 
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5.3 Potential implications 
The results obtained in this thesis help uncover the neural mechanisms 
behind human prior belief formation  (d'Acremont and Bossaerts, 2012), and 
give insights on how the human brain is capable of performing decisions 
close to the optimal prescribed by Bayesian statistics. This can have 
implications for understanding learning disabilities and abnormal decision-
making behavior. Learning, from a Bayesian point of view, can be seen as 
the weight given to new sensory information over prior beliefs (Courville et 
al., 2006). When the prior is more certain then less learning from new 
information should occur, and vice versa (Courville et al., 2006). 
Furthermore, optimal decision-making also implies an accurate evaluation of 
the uncertainty in both prior beliefs and current information (Kording and 
Wolpert, 2004, Kording, 2007). Changes in the brain areas or 
neuromodulators that are involved in this process may lead to an 
underestimation or overestimation of uncertainty, and the resulting learning 
or decision-making deficits can be predicted if one knows the particular 
function of each of these areas and neuromodulators. This knowledge can 
then help guide targeted solutions, for example by providing explicit 
information about the actual uncertainty or by incentivizing attention to it.  
Our findings can also help guide future models of how the brain 
represents uncertainty. Many theories have been proposed on how the brain 
could represent uncertainty (see subsection 1.5 of this thesis). Our findings 
suggest different types of coding for different types of uncertainty: prior 
uncertainty seems to be encoded in specialized brain areas (Hsu et al., 
2005, Preuschoff et al., 2006, Schultz et al., 2008, Singer et al., 2009), while 
likelihood uncertainty appears to be encoded in the same neurons that also 
transmit the stimulus information itself, in this case visual stimulus (Ma et al., 
2006, Fiser et al., 2010). Furthermore, dopamine seems to affect the 
processing of likelihood uncertainty, and given its neuromodulatory property 
it may be that it influences the strength of the connections between neurons 
(Wu and Amari, 2003). Future theories about neural representations of 
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uncertainty should consider prior and likelihood uncertainty separately, 
given that both neuronally and behaviorally they are separable. 
The proposed role of dopaminergic transmission from the putamen 
in guiding seeking and attention to new incoming sensory information, 
including to its uncertainty, can aid in the understanding of some of the 
symptoms PD patients have. Never medicated PD patients have shown 
selective deficits in novelty seeking, i.e. they seem to have less of a drive to 
seek new information (Bodi et al., 2009). Interestingly, these deficits can be 
remediated with dopamine agonist administration (Bodi et al., 2009). 
Dopamine agonist administration, however, can have its own side effects: it 
has been reported that it leads to compulsive shopping, hypersexuality and 
compulsive gambling (Bostwick et al., 2009, Vilas et al., 2012), which can be 
considered an excessive drive to seek new sensory information. If these 
symptoms are indeed related to a diminished or excessive attention to new 
sensory information, then these deficits can be ameliorated by for example 
increasing the uncertainty in the prior or in the current information. 
 The observation that the way people trust and reciprocate in a 
similar way regardless of money or physical effort being exchanged has two 
main methodological implications: first, it validates the use of the classic 
monetary trust game as a potential way to measure general trust and 
reciprocity. Second, it offers the possibility of studying trust and reciprocity in 
a game in which only physical effort is exchanged. This has potential 
advantages: a main one is that it would be very easy to change the value of 
each trading unit (a small change in a single line code would make one 
“energy block” much more effort demanding), and hence in a much more 
inexpensive way allow for the study of how trust and reciprocity are affected 
when there are high stakes at play. Another potential advantage is that it 
may allow for a better sampling of the population, given that it is easier to 
obtain a wider coverage of the population’s physical effort cost functions 
than of the monetary cost functions (e.g. it is probably easier to obtain a 
very fit subject than a very rich one), which can lead to a broader and more 
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representative set of behaviors. The physical-effort based trust game 
developed here can thus provide a potential new tool to inexpensively study 
trust and reciprocity over a wide range of stake sizes and cost functions. 
The finding of individual traits and potential neural correlates on how 
someone deals with uncertainty can have implications for anxiety disorders 
and depression. Anxious people and animals overreact to uncertain or 
ambiguous sensory stimuli (Nader and Balleine, 2007, Tsetsenis et al., 
2007) and a biased negative interpretation of uncertain stimuli may be a key 
factor leading to depression (Beck, 2008, Enkel et al., 2010). Interestingly, 
these behaviors have been associated with an overreactive amygdala 
(Tsetsenis et al., 2007, Enkel et al., 2010), which is precisely one of the 
brain areas we found more active with increased prior uncertainty, i.e. 
uncertainty in one’s beliefs. Anxiety and depression can thus in part result 
from an incorrect estimation of prior and current sensory uncertainty due to 
under or overreactivity of the corresponding brain areas. 
 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
Taken together, the results from this thesis suggest that we are, in general, 
quite well equipped with dealing with uncertainty. We can take into account 
uncertainty in both prior and current sensory information. We can even 
combine these different sources of uncertainty in a way that is qualitatively 
close to the optimum prescribed by Bayesian statistics. We seem to do so 
by devoting specific brain areas to each kind of uncertainty: prior uncertainty 
was correlated with increased activations in putamen, amygdala, insula and 
OFC, while current sensory uncertainty was associated with activations in 
higher-level visual areas (chapter 2). Moreover, some particular brain areas 
and neuromodulators, namely putamen and dopamine, potentially tell us 
when we should pay attention to current sensory information and its 
uncertainty, and when not (chapter 2 and 3). Finally, when faced with social 
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uncertainty, we seem to trust in a similar way regardless of what is being 
traded, money or physical effort (chapter 4). And this trust pays off: subjects 
in our experiment on average trusted their anonymous partners, and 
received more than if they had not trusted at all.  
This thesis was a small step towards the understanding of decision-
making under uncertainty and the neural mechanisms involved in it. Much 
still needs to be researched about this topic: for example, what are the 
causal roles of the other brain areas we found related with prior uncertainty? 
How generalizable are these results? Are there other neuromodulators 
involved? How do these brain areas and neuromodulators interact? The 
answer to these and other questions is still uncertain. And that is wonderful. 
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6. APPENDIX 
 
Supplementary tables 
cluster Voxel Regions 
pcor
1
 Ke
2
 punc
3
 pcor
4
 T
5
 Z
6
 x
7
 y
7
 z
7
    Region - L/R
8
 
0 114 0 0.001 7.27 5.82 -30 8 -26 temp pole-L 
   0.95 4.25 3.86 -22 0 -22 Amygdala-L 
0.02 40 0.004 0.001 7.1 5.72 24 -18 12 putamen/ i.c. -R 
0.124 21 0.029 0.001 7.08 5.71 58 6 -24 temp mid -R 
0.001 86 0 0.002 6.83 5.57 30 -2 -2 putamen-R 
   0.056 5.74 4.91 20 -6 -8 g pallidus-R 
0.014 44 0.003 0.007 6.5 5.38 30 16 -30 temp pole-R 
0.001 72 0 0.015 6.21 5.2 62 28 -2 front inf tri-R 
   0.261 5.14 4.5 66 14 4 front inf oper-R 
0.003 62 0.001 0.018 6.16 5.17 16 -42 52 PCC/ pc lob-R 
   0.097 5.54 4.77 18 -30 40 PCC-R 
0.112 22 0.026 0.024 6.05 5.1 -34 -20 10 insula-L 
0.191 17 0.046 0.029 5.98 5.06 66 2 -12 temp sup-R 
0.082 25 0.019 0.042 5.84 4.97 20 -4 14 
between putamen 
and caudate/ 
i.c. (genu)-R 
0.074 26 0.017 0.045 5.82 4.96 -60 -8 -14 STS-L 
0.034 34 0.008 0.048 5.8 4.94 22 26 -12 OFC-R 
0.004 60 0.001 0.106 5.5 4.75 22 0 -20 amygdala-R 
0.034 34 0.008 0.189 5.28 4.59 -56 8 -28 temp mid-L 
   0.273 5.12 4.49 -52 0 -32 temp mid-L 
0.031 35 0.007 0.195 5.26 4.59 -44 10 -18 temp pole sup-L 
0.411 10 0.115 0.275 5.12 4.49 -22 0 4 putamen-L 
 
Supplementary Table S1. Areas more active with increased prior uncertainty. 
Local maxima of clusters, p < 0.0001 uncorrected. Clusters with k < 10 voxels not 
shown. Columns of the table represent, by order: 
1
Corrected (family-wise) cluster-
level p-value; 
2
Cluster size (voxels); 
3
Uncorrected cluster-level p-value; 
4
Corrected 
(family-wise) voxel-level p-value; 
5
T-statistic of voxel; 
6
Z-score of voxel; 
7
(x, y, z) are 
the MNI coordinate of voxel location (mm); 
8
Laterality (L = left, R = right). Regions 
legend: front inf oper = inferior frontal (pars opercularis); front inf tri = inferior frontal 
(pars triangularis); g pallidus = globus pallidus; i.c. = internal capsule; pc lob = 
paracentral lobule; PCC = posterior cingulate cortex; STS = superior temporal 
sulcus; temp mid= middle temporal; temp pole = temporal pole; temp sup = 
temporal superior. 
180 
 
cluster Voxel Regions 
pcor Ke punc pcor T Z x y z Region – L/R 
0.009 49 0.002 0 10.13 7.17 -16 30 14 near ACC-L 
0 217 0 0 7.89 6.14 22 26 28 front sup-R 
   0.004 6.64 5.46 14 24 28 ACC-R 
   0.032 5.95 5.04 24 24 36 front mid-R 
0.02 40 0.004 0 7.37 5.87 6 22 10 near caudate-R 
   0.591 4.73 4.21 10 14 6 caudate-R 
0.018 41 0.004 0.001 7.1 5.72 36 6 26 front inf ope-R 
0.091 24 0.021 0.003 6.74 5.52 24 10 58 front sup-R 
0.02 40 0.004 0.003 6.73 5.51 -50 -54 -2 temp mid-L 
0.002 66 0.001 0.008 6.42 5.33 36 18 -6 insula-R 
   0.013 6.27 5.24 30 24 2 insula-R 
0.002 68 0 0.012 6.29 5.25 -28 -78 -18 fusiform-L 
   0.025 6.03 5.09 -18 -74 -20 cerebellum 
0 89 0 0.016 6.2 5.2 28 -92 6 occip mid-R 
   0.052 5.77 4.93 36 -82 2 occip mid-R 
   0.956 4.23 3.84 26 -86 0 occip mid-R 
0.411 10 0.115 0.017 6.16 5.17 -20 -18 6 thalamus-L 
0.055 29 0.012 0.018 6.16 5.17 28 -68 -24 cerebellum 
0.028 36 0.006 0.021 6.11 5.14 40 -74 40 angular-R 
0.005 56 0.001 0.026 6.02 5.08 42 -44 -18 fusiform-R 
   0.168 5.32 4.63 52 -42 -10 temp inf-R 
   0.248 5.16 4.52 52 -48 -18 temp inf-R 
0.022 39 0.005 0.047 5.81 4.95 -42 -74 18 occip mid-L 
0 102 0 0.049 5.79 4.94 50 -60 2 temp mid-L 
   0.155 5.36 4.65 38 -66 8 occip mid-R 
0.034 34 0.008 0.054 5.75 4.91 8 22 54 SMA-R 
   0.526 4.8 4.26 8 30 48 front sup med-R 
0.05 30 0.011 0.055 5.75 4.91 26 64 4 front sup-R 
0.038 33 0.008 0.089 5.57 4.79 -28 34 10 front inf tri-L 
 
Supplementary Table S2. Areas more active with decreased prior uncertainty. 
Local maxima of clusters, p < 0.0001 uncorrected. Clusters with k < 10 voxels not 
shown. Columns of the table are the same as in Supplementary Table 1. Regions 
legend: ACC = anterior cingulate cortex; front inf oper = inferior frontal (pars 
opercularis); front inf tri = inferior frontal (pars triangularis); front mid = middle 
frontal; front sup = superior frontal; front sup med = medial superior frontal; occip 
mid = middle occipital; SMA = supplementary motor area; temp inf = inferior 
temporal. 
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Con 
trast 
Cluster Voxel Regions 
pcor Ke punc pcor T Z x y z 
Region–
L/R 
L>l 0.002 69 0 0.05 5.79 4.93 -14 -92 22 
occip sup-
L 
L>l 0.265 14 0.067 0.851 4.44 3.99 20 -90 18 
occip sup-
R 
l > L 0.295 13 0.076 0.812 4.49 4.03 34 -88 2 
occip mid-
R 
pL 0 1770 0 0.001 12.31 5.8 6 -90 2 
calcarine-
R 
pL    0.001 11.97 5.74 10 -92 14 cuneus-R 
pL    0.008 10.07 5.36 -20 -90 28 
occip sup-
L 
pL    0.02 9.34 5.18 24 -88 20 
occip sup-
R 
pL 0.234 10 0.028 0.374 7.26 4.6 8 -76 54 precuneus 
pL 0.002 38 0 0.809 6.38 4.3 2 -54 52 
precuneus
-R 
pL 0.126 13 0.014 0.928 6 4.16 -10 -70 58 
precuneus
-L 
pBS 
0.034 
 
22 0.004 0.085 8.26 4.9 12 48 32 
front sup 
med-R 
 
Supplementary Table S3. Areas more active with increased likelihood 
uncertainty (L>l contrast), decreased likelihood uncertainty (l> L contrast), a 
parametric increase in likelihood uncertainty (pL contrast) and a parametric 
increase in the instantaneous Bayesian slope (pBS contrast). Local maxima of 
clusters, p < 0.0001 uncorrected. Clusters with k < 10 voxels not shown. Columns of 
the table are the same as in Supplementary Table 1. Region legend: occip sup = 
superior occipital; occip mid = middle occipital; front sup med = medial superior 
frontal. 
 
 
